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ADAPTING HUMAN RIGHTS
RHETT B. LARSON†

ABSTRACT
Governmental leaders, scholars, and activists have advocated for
human rights to food, water, education, health care, and energy. Such
rights, also called positive rights, place an affirmative duty upon the
state to provide a minimum quantity and quality of these goods and
services to all citizens. But food, education, water, and health care are
so different–in how they are produced, consumed, and financed–that
the implementation of a positive right must be adapted to the distinctive
characteristics of the good or service it guarantees. The primary aims of
this adaptive implementation are transparency, enforceability and
sustainability in the provision of positive rights. Only by adapting a
positive right to its policy environment can such a right function as a
viable means of protecting disadvantaged members of society. This
article uses the example of positive rights to public utilities, such as
water and energy, to illustrate adaptive implementation of positive
rights. In doing so, this article explains why and how a positive right
must be adapted to the unique policy environment of a given public
utility.
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INTRODUCTION
By 2030, population growth, economic development, and global
climate change will increase demand for food, water, and energy by
1
fifty percent. In response to these pressures, and growing concerns
for wealth inequities, many scholars, activists, and government
officials have advocated for, or enacted, a human right to food, water,
2
sanitation, and energy. These human rights are typically formulated
as positive rights, an affirmative obligation of the state to provide a
minimum quantity and quality of these goods and services to all
3
citizens. The rationale behind a positive right is that it guarantees

1. Patricia Wouters, Sergei Vinogradov & Bjørn-Oliver Magsig, Water Security,
Hydrosolidarity, and International Law: A River Runs Through It, 19 YEARBOOK OF INT’L.
ENVTL. L. 97, 98 (2008).
2. See, e.g., United Nations, THE RIGHT TO WATER AND SANITATION IN NATIONAL
LAW,
http://www.righttowater.info/progress-so-far/national-legislation-on-the-right-to-water/
(ensuring a fundamental human right to water); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the
Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363 (2010) (exploring the policy
of adaptations to climate change and identifying trends in environmental law’s involvement in
these adaptations); Stephen McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International
Implications, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1992) (inferring a right to water under basic
international law); Stephen R. Tully, The Contribution of Human Rights to Universal Energy
Access, 4 NW. UNIV. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 518 (2006) (asserting that the right to energy is a human
right); Smita Narula, The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable under International
Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 691 (2006) (identifying the right to food as a basic human
right).
3. The distinction between negative and positive rights was notably developed in I.
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the provision of goods and services essential to basic human welfare,
4
in effect, advancing the achievement of an equitable and free society.
Public utilities provide these kinds of essential goods and services,
including sanitation, water, and energy. But how such a right should
be implemented depends on the unique characteristics of the goods or
services the right guarantees. For example, applying a positive rights
approach to public utilities can potentially be perversely counter5
productive.
Recent events in the City of Detroit provide an example of why a
positive right connected to public utilities is problematic. In 2013,
Detroit declared bankruptcy in the wake of mounting debt and
6
declining revenues. The declining revenues were attributable in part
7
to the difficult financial situations faced by many citizens of Detroit.
Both the city and its citizens were impacted in particular in water
services, with many delinquent accounts costing the city millions of
8
dollars. Detroit began shutting off water services to these delinquent
9
accounts, resulting in city-wide protests. The city noted that cost
recovery improved as consumers paid overdue bills or entered into a
10
repayment program after being shut off. Nevertheless, the city
ceased cutting off water services after the judge in Detroit’s

BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118–34 (1969). See Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive
Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001), for a critical evaluation of positive rights. See Kenneth
Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an
International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63–73 (2004), for a defense of this
approach.
4. Rhett B. Larson, The New Right in Water, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2194–2200
(2013). See generally Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1758 (2008) [hereinafter New Right in Water] (arguing that human rights create efficiency and
benefit overall human welfare).
5. Id. at 2257–58; see also Rhett B. Larson, Reconciling Energy and Food Security, 48 U.
RICH. L. REV. 929, 938–40 (2014) [hereinafter Reconciling Energy] (explaining that a human
right to an exhaustible resource gives consumers no incentive to conserve that resource).
6. David A. Skeel, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy Be An Option (For People, Places, or
Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217, 2220 (2014).
7. John Reeves, 19 Shocking Facts About Detroit’s Bankruptcy, USA TODAY (Dec. 3,
2013), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2013/12/02/19-factsabout-detroit-bankruptcy/3823355/.
8. Detroit has 175,000 residential water accounts, with 80,000 accounts past due, owing a
total of $43 million (an average of $540 per account). Matthew Dolan, Detroit’s Water Cutoffs
Spark Protests, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2014), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/detroitswater-cutoffs-spark-protests-1405714429.
9. Id.
10. Alisa Priddle & Matt Helms, Bankruptcy Judge Tells Detroit to Address Water
Shutoffs, USA TODAY (July 16, 2014), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2014/07/16/detroit-bankruptcy-water/12734925/.
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bankruptcy proceedings, as well as the United Nations, protestors,
and commentators raised concerns that cutting off water violates a
11
fundamental human right. Similar large protests erupted in late 2014
in response to Ireland’s imposition of new water fees as part of its
austerity program, with opponents arguing that the water fees violate
12
human rights.
Does the protection of human rights mean that the City of
Detroit is prohibited from cutting off consumers who do not pay their
water bills, or that Detroit is required to provide a certain amount of
drinking water for free, or far below cost? The design, development,
construction, and maintenance of traditional water treatment and
distribution systems are expensive, and the energy demands and costs
13
for water treatment and transportation are high. How can an
insolvent Detroit afford to provide free or cheap water without
ultimately sacrificing the integrity of the system, the quality of the
water, and the financial health of the city?
The problem of higher consumption of cheap water is all the
more difficult where water is scarce. The challenge of not recovering
costs for supplying water faced by places like Detroit and Ireland is
then aggravated by a low water supply–in that case, the city risks
running out of money and also running out of water. For example, the
City of San Bernardino, located in drought-stricken California,
14
recently declared bankruptcy like Detroit. Around the same time,
15
California’s “Human Right to Water Bill” came into effect. That bill
recognizes that “every human being has the right to safe, clean,
16
affordable, and accessible water.” Does such a right require free or
11. Alana Semuels, Thousands Go Without Water as Detroit Cuts Service for Nonpayment,
LOS ANGELES TIMES (June 28, 2014), available at http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-detroitwater-20140629-story.html.
12. Kate Galbraith, Ireland Sets Water Fees, Angering Thousands, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12,
2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/business/international/ireland-sets-waterfees-angering-thousands.html?_r=0.
13. Amy Hardberger, Powering the Tap Dry: Regulatory Alternatives for the Energy-Water
Nexus, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 529, 532 (2013).
14. Robin Respaut, Hoping for Progress, San Bernardino Sets Bankruptcy Case Deadlines,
REUTERS (July 10, 2014), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/10/usamunicipality-sanbernardino-idUSL2N0PL01J20140710; Veronica Rocha, California Drought
Will Only Get Worse, Experts Say, LOS ANGELES TIMES (July 19, 2014), available at
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-california-drought-worsen-20140718-story.html.
15. Skylar Marshall, California Declares a Human Right to Water, UNIVERSITY OF
DENVER WATER LAW REVIEW BLOG (June 10, 2013), http://duwaterlawreview.com/ca-humanright-to-water/.
16. CAL. WATER CODE § 106.3(a) (West 2012); see generally INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW CLINIC, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, SCHOOL OF L., THE HUMAN RIGHT TO
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low-priced water, and if so, how much water and for whom? If
consumers do not internalize the costs of consumption associated
with a positive right to water, then they will have little incentive to
17
conserve. How could San Bernardino meet the requirements of
California’s human right to water without aggravating or prolonging
both money and water scarcity?
Similar problems also arise in the case of energy utilities.
Consumers obtaining cheap energy via a positive right will have little
incentive to conserve. Furthermore, the provider will have trouble
recovering costs. Combined, cheap energy under a positive right will
degrade infrastructure (making it less efficient) and aggravate
18
greenhouse gas emissions contributing to climate change.
This article argues that the implementation of positive rights
must be adapted to the unique policy environment in which such
rights are implemented, so as to ensure that their provision is
sustainable, transparent, and enforceable. These conditions are like
air, light, and water to a living organism–without them, life cannot
survive. And just as living organisms must adapt to their environment
in order to thrive, so too must positive rights adapt to their unique
policy environment. Just as birds adapt to life in mountains, islands,
or deserts, so too must positive rights adapt to the different policy
environments of health care, education, food, and water. To achieve
the goals of transparency, enforceability, and sustainability, a positive
right must be adapted to the unique characteristics of the good or
service it guarantees. This Article uses the example of positive human
rights to public utilities to illustrate the need for the adaptive
19
implementation of such rights.
The characteristics of public utilities like water treatment and

WATER BILL IN CALIFORNIA: AN IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK FOR STATE AGENCIES
(May 2013), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ Water_Report_2013_Interactive
_FINAL.pdf (affirming California’s recognition of water as a human right).
17. Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L. 515, 523
(2007).
18. Sarah Krakoff, Planetarian Identity Formation and the Relocalization of Environmental
Law, 64 FLA. L. REV. 87, 98 (2012).
19. See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1237–38 (1982) (discussing adaptive implementation within the context of
general regulatory theory instead of within a positive rights context); see also Alejandro
Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management, 55
UCLA L. REV. 293, 297–98 (2007) (discussing the role of regulatory adaptive implementation in
protecting endangered species); Jonathan Cannon, A Bargain for Clean Water, 17 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 608, 625 (2008) (explaining the use of regulatory adaptive implementation of water
pollution measures).
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distribution, wastewater collection and treatment, and the
transmission of energy, create unique challenges to the
20
implementation of positive rights. Public utilities have high initial
capital requirements that effectively bar competitors from entering
21
the market. This “natural monopoly” limits competition as a means
22
for price control. Without market forces to suppress prices,
government regulators typically set rates on public utilities to avoid
23
monopolistic pricing. However, these rates must still be set high
enough to recover the cost of service and provide a rate of return that
will attract investment and the expertise necessary for public utilities
24
management. Furthermore, the rates must be set high enough to
25
encourage conservation. But a positive right to public utilities may
drive rates too low, reducing necessary cost-recovery for providers
26
Furthermore, courts
and cost-internalization for consumers.
adjudicating a positive right to public utilities may lack the
institutional competence to deal with the highly technical questions
27
associated with rate-setting and natural resource management. With
these considerations in mind, the implementation of positive rights to

20. See New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2188 (explaining that adopting formal water
rights in India did not improve access to water); see also Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Human
Right to Water, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 581 (2007) (“The problem of a human right
to water, being a natural monopoly, raises more emotions that any other issue relating to
economic, cultural, and social human right, such as housing and the eradication of
poverty. . . .”).
21. Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis
of the Cable Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1372 (1986).
22. Id.; see also Michael K. Kellogg, John Thorne & Peter W. Huber, Telecommunications
in Jericho, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1213–14 (1993) (characterizing telecommunications as a
protected industry whose monopoly bars competitive prices).
23. Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New Model for
U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 81 (2007).
24. Id.; see also Richard J. Pierce, Price Level Regulation Based on Inflation is Not an
Attractive Alternative to Profit Level Regulation, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 665, 665–79 (1990).
25. See David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy
Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 136–37 (2012) (describing the
common law rule of capture’s detrimental effect on conserving resources and on stabilizing
prices).
26. See generally Juliet B. Schor, Prices and Quantities: Unsustainable Consumption and
the Global Economy, 55 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 309 (2005) (discussing the relationship
between low prices and unsustainable consumption); see also Glenn Blackmon & Richard
Zeckhauser, Fragile Commitments and the Regulatory Process, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 73, 90 (1992)
(explaining that a low public utility cost creates inefficient cost recovery); see also David B.
Spence, The Political Barriers to a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1451, 1454–55 (2010)
(stating that energy regulation prioritizes low pricing rates).
27. Jim Rossi, Moving Public Law Out of the Deference Trap in Regulated Industries, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 617, 627 (2005).
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food, education, or health care will require different adaptations, just
as the policy environment of different positive rights will require
different adaptations to achieve transparency, enforceability, and
sustainability.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes positive
rights and distinguishes them from negative rights, and explains how
positive rights have been applied to public utilities. Part II explains
how the characteristics of public utilities often make a positive rights
approach unenforceable, inequitable, and/or unsustainable, and why
they therefore require adaptive implementation. Part III proposes
and evaluates three potential reforms that should be used to
effectively adapt the implementation of a positive right to public
utilities, and avoid or mitigate the problems associated with such
rights.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF POSITIVE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES
People are rarely “against” sustainability, transparency, or
human rights when they are considered separately or in the abstract.
These elements should be the primary aims of any human right.
However, when considered together, and in light of practical
implementation, these elements can often form a combustible
mixture. The viability of any positive right depends not only upon the
policy arena in which the right will be applied, but also upon tailoring
28
the implementation to that policy arena. The tailoring of regulation
and judicial oversight to the characteristics of the good or service
guaranteed by a positive right is known as an adaptive
implementation. A positive right to education or food should not be
treated the same as the human right to public utilities, but positive
rights laws should be implemented to the unique characteristics of the
good or service guaranteed by the state.
This Part lays the foundation for understanding why the
implementation of positive rights in public utilities often fail and how
positive rights can be tailored to the public utilities arena by (A)
explaining positive rights and distinguishing them from negative
rights; (B) explaining public utilities and differentiating them from
other policy arenas in which positive rights are implemented; and (C)

28. See, e.g., Molly Land, Rebalancing TRIPS, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 433, 472 (2012)
(arguing that human rights implicated by intellectual property law should be tailored to that
particular policy arena).
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explaining and evaluating how positive rights have been implemented
in the public utilities context.
A. Distinguishing Positive Rights from Negative Rights
The term “right” is often applied to a policy aim without regard
to its legal implications, simply being used as a moniker by policy
29
entrepreneurs to indicate high importance. Additionally, this term
has obvious rhetorical value in public policy debates and meaning
30
within the literature on natural rights. For purposes of this article,
however, a “right” is a legally established and enforceable obligation
or restraint imposed on government and held by citizens, either
31
individually or collectively.
Rights are often divided into two categories – positive rights and
32
negative rights. The distinction is, superficially, intuitive and
straightforward. Negative rights forbid the government from engaging
in certain actions such as interfering with speech or discriminating on
33
the basis of race. Positive rights require the government to engage in
34
certain actions, as with the provision of health care or education. On
35
closer examination, however, the distinction is problematic. For
example, the enforcement and enjoyment of any negative right
requires a minimum level of health, education, civic participation

29. New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2198 (citing Daniel Bodansky, Climate Change
and Human Rights: Unpacking the Issues, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 511, 514 (2010)).
30. See generally LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953)[Source on order;
not yet substantiated]; Phillip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American
Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993) (discussing natural rights in the context of constitutional
law and natural rights).
31. Cross, supra note 3, at 860.
32. See generally Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1363 (1984)
(discussing four contemporary critiques to the liberal theory of rights); see also Susan Bandes,
The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990) (critiquing the notion that
the Constitution ensures citizens only negative liberties); but see New Right in Water, supra note
4 (arguing that rights could more accurately be divided into “provision rights” and
“participation rights”).
33. See, e.g., C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 110 (1978) (analyzing individual rights within
community morality); see also Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1911 (2001) (asserting that citizens’ individual constitutional rights in
liberal democracies should ensure their government commitment to fundamental human
welfare).
34. Id.; see also Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277,
1279–80 (1989) (advocating a new rights-based analysis centered on negative rights).
35. See Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312, 314
(1967) (arguing that there is no useful distinction between abstract and theoretical notions of
positive and negative rights).
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36

opportunities, judicial process, and security. Yet arguably, that
minimum level of government provision of goods and services would
not be achieved without restrictions on government interference with
37
speech, assembly, liberty, and property. Additionally, any legal right,
whether positive or negative, requires the government to provide
38
something. Even an ostensibly negative right like freedom of speech
arguably requires the state provide a forum in which that right can be
39
delineated, adjudicated, and enforced. In a sense, therefore, a right
is like a magnet, having both a positive and negative pole.
Despite this “rights polarity,” the distinction between positive
40
and negative rights remains useful. In international law, the
distinction is often drawn between “civil and political rights” (roughly
the corollary of negative rights) and “economic, social, and cultural
41
rights” (roughly the corollary of positive rights). Civil and political
rights in international law have proven relatively uncontroversial and
effectively enforceable, with an existing protocol for bringing claims
42
of rights violations to international tribunals. Economic, social, and
cultural rights, on the other hand, lack a binding protocol for
adjudicating claims, and require states only to progressively realize
43
these rights subject to available resources. International human

36. See Theodor Meron, Norm Making and Supervision in International Human Rights:
Reflections on Institutional Order, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 754, 757 (1982) (noting that developing
countries must achieve “a level of economic development that enables them to implement social
rights, and that those states must therefore give priority to social rights and to economic and
social development in order to facilitate the realization of civil and political rights.”).
37. Id. at 756–58 (noting that despite the need to promote social and economic rights, civil
and political rights “lend themselves. . . to immediate implementation.”).
38. Cross, supra note 3, at 864–65 (noting that “all rights, including negative ones, require
government enforcement.”).
39. Id.; see also New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2203.
40. Cross, supra note 3, at 865–67.
41. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 52, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter “the
CP Covenant”] (asserting every citizen’s right to basic human liberties including selfdetermination); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16,
1966) [hereinafter “the ESC Covenant”] (resolving that states party to the covenant will actively
promote citizens’ fundamental rights); see also New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2185–86.
42. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966)
[hereinafter “Optional Protocol to CP Covenant”].
43. See ESC Covenant, supra note 41; see also Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10 2008)
[hereinafter “Optional Protocol to the ESC Covenant”] (establishing protocol for states party to
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights).
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rights law illustrates that, while the conceptual distinction between
positive and negative rights is difficult to draw, practical differences in
enforceability and the political viability of implementation make the
44
distinction relevant. The question still remains how to draw the
45
practical distinction.
The distinction I propose is based on the aim of the right. Where
the aim of a right is the provision of a primary good, it is a positive
right; otherwise, it is a negative right. For purposes of distinguishing
positive and negative rights, primary goods are the minimum amount
of those goods and services necessary for basic human welfare and
opportunity for civic engagement – a minimum quantity and quality
of water, food, shelter [including light and heat], health care, and
46
education.
The aim of positive rights is to make primary goods, those goods
and services essential for basic human dignity, affordable and
47
accessible to all. It is an approach intended to “put first things first”
– to provide a baseline level of health and security, without which any
48
other right would be meaningless. It is born of the intuition that the
state cannot approach someone dying of thirst or freezing to death
and say, “[a]t least you still have the writ of habeas corpus.” The
intent of distinguishing positive and negative rights in this paper is not
to advocate for or against positive rights. Instead, it is to define the
positive rights approach in order to understand why it is problematic
when applied to public utilities, and whether such problems are
surmountable.

44. See Sharmila L. Murthy, The Human Right(s) to Water and Sanitation: History,
Meaning, and the Controversy Over-Privatization, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 89, 113–14 (2013)
(summarizing the obligations associated with a human right to water under international law).
45. Cross, supra note 3, at 866 (proposing a simple question to reveal the distinction
between positive and negative rights — “If there was no government in existence, would the
right be automatically fulfilled?”). But this test requires an assumption of the absence of
government that does little to help formulate a practical distinction in a world of government
protected rights.
46. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62 (1971) (“[S]uppose that the basic structure of
society distributes certain primary goods, that is, things that every rational man is presumed to
want. . . . For simplicity, assume that the chief primary goods at the disposition of society are
rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth.”); see also New Right in Water, supra
note 4, at 2200–01.
47. Wenonah Hauter, The Limits of International Human Rights Law and the Role of Food
Sovereignty in Protecting People from Further Trade Liberalization under the Doha Round
Negotiations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1071, 1083 (2007).
48. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 121–22
(1969); see also New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2200.
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B. The Characteristics of Public Utilities
To understand why the application of a positive right to public
utilities is problematic, and to evaluate how those problems might be
addressed, it is necessary to understand the nature of public utilities.
For the purpose of this article, public utilities are natural monopolies
49
directly dependent upon exhaustible natural resources. This
definition includes, in particular, water treatment and distribution,
wastewater collection, treatment and disposal, and energy
transmission.
A natural monopoly occurs when (1) there are significant
barriers to entry into the market, particularly due to large initial
capital requirements that effectively bar potential competitors; and
(2) large economies of scale, such that there are very low marginal
costs, allowing the natural monopoly to serve additional consumers
50
more efficiently than any potential competitor. Water, sanitation,
and electrical transmission are examples of natural monopolies. The
high initial capital requirements effectively bar competitors from the
market, and large economies of scale allow providers to serve
51
additional customers at low marginal costs. It is difficult for a
newcomer to compete with a system where the costly plants, pipes,
and lines have already been laid, and when it is so much cheaper to
simply extend the existing system to serve one more customer than to
52
attempt to compete from scratch.
These natural monopolies create challenges with respect to
pricing, particularly where they involve private property that has
become “affected with a public interest,” or private property that the
53
general public must be able to access. In such cases, consumers have

49. Water remains a part of the hydrologic cycle, and thus is in some sense “renewable.”
However, where consumption outstrips natural replenishment, the water source is effectively
exhausted. See, e.g., Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some Considerations for Water Law, 56
ALA. L. REV. 1009 (2005).
50. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1401 (1998) (analyzing why regulation of public utility
monopolies fail).
51. See generally Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 548 (1969) (discussing whether natural monopolies justify the imposition of regulations).
52. Id.; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: An
American Historical Perspective, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1263, 1287 (1984) (explaining the principle
that incumbent operators often wish to make outsiders’ entry into the market difficult).
53. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124–25 (1877) (explaining when “one devotes his
property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest
in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent
of the interest he has thus created”).
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no choice but to buy from the monopoly. Without traditional market
forces to restrain pricing, natural monopolies are typically subject to
55
rate-setting by the state to curb monopolistic pricing. Where the
natural monopoly is not a state agency, but is instead a regulated
private entity, it has a quid pro quo relationship with the state – the
state grants a monopoly to provide a certain service to a certain
geographic area over a specified period of time (often through a
“concession contract”) in exchange for the utility company assuming
56
certain affirmative duties. These common law duties can largely be
summed up as obligations to fairly and equitably serve all similarly
situated customers upon reasonable terms, with contract terms
57
related to service construed strictly in favor of the public. The state
typically determines the reasonableness of prices and the scope of the
monopoly, either through the regulatory process, the concession
58
contract, or some combination of the two.
While there are many approaches to rate setting, the process
typically involves setting tariffs to allow the utility to recover the cost
of service and provide a rate of return for the utility company on its
large initial fixed-cost capital investment (called the rate base) to
59
satisfy investors and creditors. The rate of return must be sufficient
to ensure institutional confidence in the financial integrity of the
60
utility company. Therefore, the object of price regulation is to
achieve a balance of production and profit for the utility company
61
while ensuring that prices charged to consumers are reasonable.
Other types of infrastructure, which have been historically
54. See generally id. (implying that consumers must buy from natural monopolies where
they exist).
55. Posner, supra note 51, at 611.
56. Jim Chen, The Nature of the Public Utility: Infrastructure, the Market, and the Law, 98
NW. U. L. REV. 1617, 1640–41 (2004).
57. City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320, 1335 (N.D. Ind.
1979); see also United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm’n of Kentucky, 278 U.S. 300, 309 (1929)
(“The primary duty of a public utility is to serve on reasonable terms all those who desire the
service it renders.”); see generally Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837)
(holding that public utility concession contracts are construed strictly in favor of the public).
58. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1335–36 (1998) (noting the shift in many instances
from rates set on utilities and common carriers through the regulatory process to a contractbased regime).
59. Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive
Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549, 562–64 (1979).
60. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
61. See id. (“The rate-making process . . . i.e., the fixing of ‘just and reasonable’ rates,
involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.”).
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regulated like public utilities, such as transportation or
telecommunications systems, are excluded from “public utilities” for
the purpose of this paper. These enterprises do not raise similar
concerns of sustainability, either because they do not directly depend
on exhaustible natural resources or because market forces create
efficient and effective pricing mechanisms for cost-internalization and
conservation incentives. Additionally, there has been far less
advocacy for, and attempts to implement, a positive rights approach
to these types of regulated industries as compared to water,
sanitation, and energy. However, as all infrastructures depend at least
indirectly on exhaustible natural resources, and as some have begun
calling for a human right to the internet, this paper’s evaluation of the
positive right to public utilities and its prescriptions for implementing
that right may become relevant in other fields of infrastructure
62
development and regulation.
C. Applying Positive Rights to Public Utilities
Public utilities are important to human welfare by their very
nature. A normal enterprise becomes a regulated public utility
63
because it is “affected with the public interest.” It is because these
enterprises are so essential to the public interest that they are often
64
considered good candidates for the positive right status. Indeed, in
some sense, the common law duty of public utilities to serve
65
constitutes a positive right. According to this view, the theory behind
this duty is that because these services are essential, and because
consumers have no choice but to seek these services from the natural
monopoly, the natural monopoly therefore has an affirmative duty to
66
provide those services at a reasonable price. The same rationale

62. See, e.g., Molly Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J.
393, 397 (2013).
63. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124–25 (1877).
64. New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2198–00. See also Samuel R. Olken, The Decline
of Legal Classicism and the Evolution of New Deal Constitutionalism, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2051, 2078 (2014) (noting that the phrase “affected with a public interest” is not a closed class
and is imprecise in its meaning).
65. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE? 14–19 (1997) (arguing that the only positive rights that should be recognized by law are
private necessity—the use of another’s property without consent in an emergency—and the duty
of public utilities and common carriers to serve).
66. Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance, and Improper Considerations: A Common-Law
Model for the Prohibition of Racial Discrimination in the Contracting Process, 62 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 183, 203 (1993); see also Charles Fairman, The So-Called Granger Cases, Lord Hale, and
Justice Bradley, 5 STAN. L. REV. 587, 670–673 (1953).
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67

arguably supports a positive right to public utilities.
In an attempt to encourage equitable provision of public utility
68
services, many have argued in favor of a positive rights approach.
Like the duty to serve, a positive right to public utilities would
69
provide a bulwark against inequity. Without a positive right to
public utilities, some fear that a utility company’s profit motive will
70
result in unaffordable monopolistic rates for the poor. A positive
right to public utilities would, in theory, at least guarantee a minimum
71
quantity and quality of energy, drinking water, and sanitation for all.
Also, like the duty to serve, a positive right would provide a
mechanism to hold government regulators and utility companies
accountable for the management of resources and infrastructure
72
affecting the public interest.
Unlike the duty to serve, however, the positive rights approach
has particular value to policy entrepreneurs looking to raise the
profile of global problems like energy services, sanitation, and the
73
inequitable distribution of adequate drinking water. The rationale is

67. Id.; see also Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1329 (1996); William E. McCurdy, The Power of a
Public Utility to Fix its Rates and Charges in the Absence of Regulatory Legislation, 38 HARV. L.
REV. 202, 206–08 (1924).
68. See, e.g., Stefan H. Krieger, An Advocacy Model for Representation of Low-Income
Intervenors in State Public Utility Proceedings, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 639, 698 (1990) (noting that an
advocate for indigent consumers “can frame the issue as significant for the whole consuming
public (utility service as a ‘basic human right’ for all consumers) rather than as a subsidy for the
poor (regulation as income redistribution)”).
69. New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2197; see also Barton H. Thompson, Water as a
Public Commodity, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 17, 38 (2011) (discussing example of privatization of
water company in Bolivia, and ensuing rate increases, leading to inequity).
70. See Jennifer Davis, Private-Sector Participation in the Water and Sanitation Sector, 30
ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 145, 166–67 (2005) (“[M]uch of the empirical literature on
[private sector participation] in [water and sewer] service delivery documents increases in
monthly service fees following privatization.”).
71. New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2198; see also David R. Boyd, No Taps, No
Toilets: First Nations and the Constitutional Right to Water in Canada, 57 MCGILL L.J. 81, 122
(2011) (“There are a number of reasons why it is important to recognize that access to safe
drinking water is a legally protected human right, rather than a commodity or a service provided
on a charitable basis.”).
72. Boyd, supra note 71, at 122–23 (arguing that recognizing a right to water will “provide
a means of holding governments accountable”).
73. See generally Jeanne Luh, Rachel Baum & Jamie Bartram, Equity in Water and
Sanitation: Developing an Index to Measure Progressive Realization of the Human Right, 216
INT’L J. OF HYGIENE & ENVTL. HEALTH 662 (2012) (discussing the challenges of measuring
equitable access to drinking water and sanitation services in developing countries); Kilian
Reiche, et al., Expanding Electricity Access to Remote Areas: Off-Grid Rural Electrification in
Developing Countries, WORLD POWER 2000 52–60 (Guy Isherwood ed., 2000) (cataloging the
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that primary goods such as these should have a higher priority, and
74
thinking in terms of rights raises the profile of those primary goods.
By using positive rights rhetoric in advocating for the equitable
provision of public utility services, policy entrepreneurs are
75
attempting to put first things first.
Relying on these rationales, the positive rights approach has
been advocated or applied in the drinking water, sanitation, and
76
energy sectors. Energy, sanitation and water are linked in public
77
policy debates because each is embedded in the other. As water is
required to produce virtually all goods, the costs associated with
water development are embedded in all goods, a concept called
78
79
“virtual water.” The same is certainly true of “virtual energy.” In
particular, energy and water have virtual versions of the other
embedded in their production, as water treatment and transportation
is highly energy intensive, and the energy industry is one of the
80
largest water consumers in the world. Sanitation is also extremely
energy and water intensive, and thus has a high amount of both
81
energy and water embedded in collection, treatment, and disposal.
Energy, sanitation, and water services have also become interrelated
82
as important markers of economic development.
The
interdependent nature of energy, sanitation and water make the
challenges associated with inequitable energy access in developing countries).
74. New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2198 (citing Daniel Bodansky, Climate Change
and Human Rights: Unpacking the Issues, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 511, 514 (2010) (noting
the role of rights rhetoric in raising the profile and priority of certain policy aims in the context
of climate change)).
75. New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2198.
76. See, e.g., Stephen R. Tully, The Contribution of Human Rights to Universal Energy
Access, 4 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 518 (2006) (discussing the role of human rights approaches in
expanding energy access); New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2205–08 (cataloging the various
approaches to the human right to water).
77. See generally Christopher A. Scott & Martin J. Pasqualetti, Energy and Water
Resources Scarcity: Critical Infrastructure for Growth and Economic Development in Arizona
and Sonora, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 645 (2010).
78. J.A. Allan, Virtual Water – The Water, Food, and Trade Nexus: Useful Concept or
Misleading Metaphor, 28 WATER INT’L 4, 106 (2003).
79. Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 933–34.
80. See generally Peter H. Gleick, Water and Energy, 19 ANN. REV. ENERGY ENVT. 267
(1994).
81. A.K. Plappally & J.H. Leinhard, Energy Requirements for Water Production,
Treatment, End Use, Reclamation, and Disposal, 16 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY
REV. 4818 (2012) (discussing the high energy requirements for sanitation services); Carey W.
King, et al., Coherence Between Water and Energy Polices, 53 NAT. RESOURCES J. 117, 145
(2013) (noting the high consumption of fresh water and energy in the sanitation sector).
82. Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 935–36.
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promotion of any one as a human right effectively the promotion of
all three as human rights.
The positive right to water is a commonly-implemented positive
83
right to goods and services provided by public utilities, and thus
provides a useful example of how that kind of right is typically
formulated. Currently, forty-one nations have recognized the right to
water within their national constitutions, or have otherwise
84
referenced the right within national legislation. For example, Article
43 of the Constitution of Kenya provides that “[e]very person has the
85
right . . . to clean and safe water in adequate quantities.” Article 5 of
86
Indonesia’s Law on Water Resources provides that the state
guarantees individual access and availability of water for everyone
87
residing within that nation. Article 66(2) of the Constitution of
88
89
Ecuador recognizes the right to “clean water.” In each case, the
right need only be progressively realized subject to available
90
resources. Some nations, such as Uganda and Zambia, frame the
right simply as a “compelling interest” or a government “objective,”
91
subject to available resources.
In other cases, nations may not have constitutionally or
statutorily recognized the right, but have inferred it from other

83. New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2205.
84. See The Rights to Water and Sanitation in National Law, RIGHTTOWATER (Apr. 8,
2010),
http://www.righttowater.info/progress-so-far/national-legislation-on-the-right-to-water
(listing forty-one nations that have recognized water rights in constitutions, national laws,
executive proclamations, judicial decisions, and proposed legislation).
85. CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, art. 43(1)(d) (2010) (Kenya).
86. Law on Water Resources, No. 7 of 2004 (Indon.), reprinted in 2 L. ENV’T & DEV. J. 118,
122 (2006) [hereinafter “Water Resources Law”], available at http://www.leadjournal.org/content/06118.pdf.
87. See id. (“The State guarantees everyone’s right to obtain water for their minimum daily
basic needs in order to achieve a healthy, clean, and productive life.”).
88. CONSTITUTION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DEL EQUADOR [C.P.] art. 66(2), available
at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ ecuador08.html#mozTocId64283.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., id. arts. 3(1), 11(8) (mandating that the right to water, like all other
constitutional rights, “shall be developed progressively” through standards, case law, and public
policy).
91. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA (1995) arts. I, XIV(b), available at
http://www.parliament.go.ug/new/images/stories/constitution/Constitution_of_Uganda_1995.pdf
(establishing the right to “clean and safe water” as an objective that will guide the state in
making and implementing policy decisions); CONST. OF ZAMBIA of 1991 (as amended by Act
No. 18 of 1996) §§ 111, 112(d), available at http://www.parliament.gov.zm/
downloads/VOLUME%201.pdf (stating that the government “shall endeavor” to provide clean
and safe water, but that this policy principle is not “legally enforceable” in any court or
tribunal).
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express rights on the grounds that the realization of any right depends
92
on a minimum provision of primary goods. For example, the
Supreme Court of India inferred the right to water from other express
93
constitutional rights. A similar approach can be observed in
94
95
Pakistan and Bangladesh. It is not difficult to imagine how similar
inferences could be made about a right to sanitation or energy.
In the United States, California is the only state to explicitly
adopt a human right to water, in addition to recognizing the right to
96
sanitation as well. Governor Jerry Brown signed Assembly Bill 685
into law in 2012, recognizing that “every human being has the right to
safe, clean, affordable, and accessible water adequate for human
97
consumption, cooking, and sanitary purposes.” The law requires
state agencies to consider the human right to water when “revising,
98
adopting, or establishing policies, regulations, and grant criteria.”
California is not the only jurisdiction to explicitly recognize a
human right to sanitation. South Africa, Ecuador, and Uruguay have
also recognized the right to sanitation in their respective
99
constitutions. Other countries, including Costa Rica, Bangladesh,
92. See, e.g., Monique Passelec-Ross & Karin Buss, Water Stewardship in the Lower
Athabasca River: Is the Alberta Government Paying Attention to Aboriginal Rights to Water?, 23
J. ENVT’L L. & PRAC. 1, 17 (2011) (discussing how provincial governments in Canada have
inferred aboriginal water rights from express constitutional guarantees to a right of subsistence
on traditional lands).
93. See Chameli Singh v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1051, 1053 (India) (stating that
the right to water is implied by the “right to life enshrined under Article 21” of the Indian
Constitution); INDIA CONST. art. 21 (“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to procedure established by law.”).
94. See George S. McGraw, Defining and Defending the Right to Water and Its Minimum
Core: Legal Construction and the Role of National Jurisprudence, 8 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV.
127, 176–77 (2011) (discussing General Secretary v. Director, (1994) SCMR 2061 (Pak.), in
which the Pakistani Supreme Court declared that the right to have water free from pollution is
essential to life itself).
95. See id. at 175 (discussing Farooque v. Bangladesh (Radioactive Milk Powder), (1996)
WP 92/1996 S.C. ¶ 20 (Nepal), in which the Bangladeshi Supreme Court declared that the right
to life includes the right to enjoyment of pollution-free water).
96. California Assembly Bill 685 [hereinafter, Assembly Bill 685]; see also The Human
Right to Water Bill in California: An Implementation Framework for State Agencies (May 2013),
International Human Rights Law Clinic, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, SCHOOL OF L., available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Water_Report_2013_Interactive_FINAL.pdf (proposing a
framework for implementing AB 685).
97. Assembly Bill 685.
98. Id.
99. THORSTEN KIEFER ET AL., CENTER ON HOUSING RIGHTS AND EVICTIONS, LEGAL
RESOURCES FOR THE RIGHT TO WATER AND SANITATION, 59–62 (2d ed. 2008), available at
http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/wwc/Programs/Right_to_Water/Pdf_doct/RWPLegal_Res_1st_Draft_web.pdf.
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and Sri Lanka, have referenced a human right to sanitation in
100
national legislation. South Africa has explicitly recognized the right
101
to access to electricity. The formulation of these rights has proven
similar to that of the right to water – vague, largely aspirational, and
requiring either consideration only or progressive realization based
102
on available resources.
The way in which these rights are
formulated, combined with the characteristics of public utilities,
makes the application of a positive right to public utilities uniquely
challenging.
South Africa provides a useful example for the challenges
associated with a positive right to public utilities. In 1997, South
Africa became one of the first nations to explicitly recognize a
103
positive right to water in its Constitution. Section 27 of the South
African Constitution provides that everyone “has the right to have
104
access to . . . sufficient food and water.” In Phiri, a poor township of
over one million residents in the city of Johannesburg, the city
government attempted to comply with this right by charging a flat
105
rate for water services to Phiri residents.
However, because of
illegal connections, unpaid water bills, overconsumption, and leaky
pipes, Johannesburg generated only one percent of its water revenue
from deliveries to Phiri, despite the fact that Phiri received a third of
106
the city’s water.
The flat rate approach thus proved financially and ecologically

100. Id. at 75.
101. Jenny Sin-Hang Ngai, Energy as a Human Right in Armed Conflict: A Question of
Universal Need, Survival, and Human Dignity, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 579, 614–15 (2012).
102. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1631,
1655 (2009) (noting the role of the term “progressive realization” in the positive rights approach
in the South African constitution).
103. S.
AFR.
CONST.,
1996
§ 27(1),
available
at
http://www.info.gov.za/
documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf; See also Andrew L. Magaziner, The Trickle Down
Effect: The Phiri Water Rights Application and Evaluating, Understanding, and Enforcing the
South African Constitutional Right to Water, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 509, 510 (2008).
104. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 27(1).
105. Stephen C. McCaffrey & Kate J. Neville, Small Capacity and Big Responsibilities:
Financial and Legal Implications of a Human Right to Water for Developing Countries, 21 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 679, 686–87 (2009).
106. See Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 6–7 paras.11–12, 179 (S.
Afr.) (noting that “the rate of payment of municipal bills was less than 10%”); see also
COALITION AGAINST WATER PRIVATISATION ET AL., THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SILENT
DISCONNECTIONS: PREPAID METERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE IN PHIRI, SOWETO, at 6
(2004), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Phiri.pdf (listing illegal water connections
as a major contributing factor to Johannesburg Water’s decision to seek new methods for water
distribution in poor South African townships like Phiri).
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107

unsustainable in South Africa. Too few were paying for water, and
even those who paid the flat rate had no incentive to conserve water
108
once they paid. Without adequate revenue from water deliveries,
infrastructure degraded (meaning more leaks and more nonrevenue
water), water supplies diminished, and water could not be treated to a
109
healthy level. Johannesburg ultimately abandoned the flat rate
approach, instead seeking an alternative strategy to satisfy the
110
positive right to water without aggravating sustainability concerns.
The City, pursuant to national legislation, enacted ordinances to
deliver “free basic water” (6 kiloliters per household per month) with
111
any amount above that requiring pre-payment.
Citizens of Phiri
successfully challenged the “free basic water” and pre-payment
approach as a violation of their constitutional right to water at the
112
trial and appellate court levels. The trial court concluded that the
113
constitutional right required delivery of 50 liters per person per day.
On appeal, the court ruled that the constitutional right required
114
delivery of 42 liters per person per day. Ultimately, the city
prevailed on appeal to the Constitutional Court of South Africa,
which deferred to the City’s determination on how best to achieve
115
sustainable resource and infrastructure management.

107. Linda Stewart & Debra Horsten, The Role of Sustainability in the Adjudication of the
Right to Access to Adequate Water, 24 SA PUBLIC LAW 486, 493 (2009).
108. Tracy Humby & Maryse Grandbois, The Human Right to Water in South Africa and
the Mazibuko Decisions, 51 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT 521, 527 (2010); Michael Kidd, South
Africa: The Development of Water Law, in THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW AND POLITICS OF
WATER (Joseph W. Dellapenna & Joyeeta Gupta eds., 2009), 100, 100–01(noting that
conservation and sustainable management were two major challenges associated with the South
African constitutional right of access to water).
109. Humby, supra note 108, at 527; see also Mazibuko at 6–7 (noting that steel pipes in
Soweto was used without attention to corrosion protection, resulting in water leakages); Erik B.
Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 980
(2004) (noting the tension between South Africa’s human right approach to water and the goal
of maintaining infrastructure).
110. See Mazibuko at 7 (describing Johannesburg Water’s plan to change water usage in
Soweto).
111. Humby, supra note 108, at 530; see also Mazibuko at 6–7.
112. Mazibuko at 12–18. Importantly, other more affluent white neighborhoods in
Johannesburg were not required to use prepaid meters, and this was successfully challenged at
the time on grounds of racial discrimination. Additionally, the free provision of 6 kl per
household was intended to provide 25 liters per person per day, but the city failed to account for
the number of people within each household in Phiri.
113. Id. at 14.
114. Id. at 18.
115. Id. at 28–34 (reviewing for reasonableness because “courts are ill-placed to make these
assessments for both institutional and democratic reasons”).
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The challenges South Africa faced in implementing a
constitutional right to water in Phiri illustrate the difficulties likely
facing any government implementing a positive right to a public
utility. Indeed, South Africa’s struggles to implement such a positive
right are not atypical. In India, for instance, the Supreme Court
inferred a positive right to water from the constitutional right to life
116
under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The Court stated that
“the right to access to clean drinking water is fundamental to life and
there is a duty on the state under Article 21 to provide clean drinking
117
water to its citizens.” Despite this positive right, as of 2004, 17% of
the population in India did not have access to tapped, treated water,
118
including 38% percent of urban residents. Eighty percent of
children in India suffer from water-borne diseases, with a total of 44
119
million suffering from illnesses related to poor water quality. India’s
recognition of the provisional right to water illustrates the larger
reality—adopting a positive right to public utilities does not
120
necessarily improve access to water, sanitation, and energy. The
mere recognition of a right in a judicial opinion or constitution is
meaningless without effective regulation and institutional
competency.
II. WHY POSITIVE RIGHTS TO PUBLIC UTILITIES REQUIRE
ADAPTATION
The positive right to public utilities is typically formulated in a
way that leaves fundamental questions of price, quality, access, and
121
sustainability unanswered. The South African Constitution provides
“the right to have access to . . . sufficient food and water,” but does
122
not explain what would qualify as sufficient.. In India, there is “a
116. INDIA CONST. art. 21 (providing due process protection for life and liberty).
117. A.P. Pollution Control Bd. II v. Naidu, (2000) 5 S.C.R. 249, 249 (India), available at
http://www.ielrc.org/content/e0010.pdf.
118. Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31
ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 981 (2004).
119. Id.
120. See David Zetland, Water Rights and Human Rights: The Poor Will Not Need Our
Charity if We Need Their Water, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, Aug. 11, 2011, at 5–7, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1549570 (relying on data for improved water access before and after
enactment of a constitutional right to water in 12 countries compared to 12 similar countries
lacking a constitutional right to water, an empirical analysis demonstrated no impact on
improved water access arising from enactment of a constitutional right to water).
121. New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2184.
122. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §27(1), available at www.gov.za/documents/constitutionrepublic-south-africa-1996.
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duty on the state . . . to provide clean drinking water to its citizens,”
but the precise requirements of that duty are left to courts and
123
agencies to determine with little guidance. And while the right to
water provides the most common example of attempts to implement a
positive right to public utilities, similar ambiguity exists in providing
124
the right to energy and sanitation as well. This ambiguity often
leaves courts, which typically lack the necessary expertise, to either
make difficult decisions on resource sustainability and rate-setting, or
else to defer to executive agencies or the legislature; thereby,
weakening the role of the courts as mere arbiters of constitutionally
125
guaranteed rights.
The characteristics of public utilities do not lend themselves to
the straightforward application of a vaguely worded, aspirational
126
positive right. Public utilities are capital intensive.
Public utilities
also uniquely and directly depend on exhaustible natural resources,
and provide processed or treated versions of natural resources as
127
their primary service.
Additionally, unlike other candidates for
positive rights, distribution of resources by public utilities inherently
128
involves natural monopolies. Thus, the characteristics of public
utilities are distinguishable from other positive rights in that there is
often no competition to regulate prices, resulting in underpricing and
little consumer incentive to conserve natural resources.
This Part provides three reasons why positive rights to public
utilities require adaptive implementation: (A) tribunals adjudicating
positive rights claims typically lack the necessary institutional
competency to effectively decide cases involving complex issues of
resource sustainability and rate-setting, particularly where the right is
formulated in vague and aspirational terms; (B) the potential cost

123. A.P. Pollution Control Bd. II v. Naidu, (2000) 5 S.C.R. 249, 249 (India), available at
http://www.ielrc.org/content/e0010.pdf.
124. Cross, supra note 3, at 901 (noting that positive rights tend to be vague and
indeterminate); Murthy, supra note 44, at 95 (noting that the human right to sanitation involves
questions of equity, affordability, and sustainability).
125. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1441, 1480 (2008) (noting that courts have little competence in evaluating policy
arguments in technical fields like public utilities); Cross, supra note 3, at 901 (arguing that, when
faced with “imperfect information” about specific conditions, judges “are likely to do very little
to promote the ends commanded by [positive] rights”).
126. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 887 (1980).
127. See, e.g., King, et al., supra note 81, at 145 (describing the resource use required for
wastewater treatment).
128. See generally WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF NATURAL
MONOPOLY (1983).
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reduction impact of a positive right to water can make the right
economically and ecologically unsustainable because providers fail to
recover costs of service and consumers fail to internalize the cost of
consumption; and (C) the positive right to water can eliminate
incentives for public engagement and oversight, and tend to facilitate
rent-seeking by utility companies and corruption by utility regulators.
A. Positive Rights to Public Utilities and Enforceability
As seen in the example of India above, and as borne out in
empirical comparisons between countries recognizing a positive right
to public utility services and those that do not, actual provision of an
adequate public utility service does not necessarily follow from the
129
legal recognition of a positive right. One of the most common
reasons positive rights in any policy arena fail is due to the lack of
130
effective enforcement. As the arbiter of rights, the judiciary may
lack necessary institutional competency, as compared to other
governmental entities, to effectively establish minimum quantities
and qualities, and maximum and minimum prices, for services
131
provided by public utilities. In short, a positive right to public
utilities implicates the “familiar difficulties with judicial enforcement
132
of affirmative duties.”
Furthermore, the nature of the judiciary also limits the
enforceability of a positive right to public utilities because courts
generally lack the necessary expertise to flesh out the precise duties
prescribed by the right. The Constitutional Court in Mazibuko
ultimately deferred to the City’s established minimum amount and
pre-payment requirement based on what the Court called “an
understanding of the proper role of courts in our constitutional
133
democracy.”
The Constitutional Court stated that “[i]t is
institutionally inappropriate for a court to determine precisely what
the achievement of any particular social and economic right entails
and what steps government should take to ensure the progressive

129. See generally Zetland, supra note 120.
130. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1336 (2d ed.
1988) (stating that affirmative obligations placed upon governments to provide basic sustenance
to their citizens would be subject to difficulties with judicial enforcement).
131. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 618–23 (1923) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court does not have the institutional capabilities to determine the
proper allocation of natural gas between Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia).
132. TRIBE, supra note 130, at 1336.
133. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 28 (S. Afr.).
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realization of the right. This is a matter, in the first place, for the
legislature and executive, the institutions of government best placed
to investigate social conditions in the light of available budgets and to
determine what targets are achievable in relation to social and
134
economic rights.”
Answering the fundamental questions underlying a positive right
to public utilities is particularly complicated because the answer
cannot simply be about the minimum quantity and quality for survival
135
– everyone alive already has that minimum amount. Instead, the
answer depends on the highly technical determination of a minimum
amount and quality for survival at a maximum price, and also about
the nuanced issue of achieving a certain standard of living, which
involves even more complex matters of culture, economics,
136
sustainability, equity, and geography.
Executive agencies and legislatures have taken two different
approaches to the formulation and implementation of positive rights
137
to public utilities, each problematic. The first is to establish a broad,
guiding principle in the formulation of the right (for example, a
simple guarantee of “sufficient water”), allowing courts to enforce the
138
principle on a case-by-case basis. However, such ambiguity raises
139
serious enforcement challenges. Where courts lack information and
expertise regarding state budgets and revenue, the enforcement of a
140
positive right can create serious fiscal problems. Where courts lack
information and expertise regarding local conditions, including
population density, consumption patterns, hydrology, climate, and
ecology, judicial enforcement of positive rights may prove inadequate

134. Id. at 30 para. 61.
135. Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 958 (“A central question at the heart of food,
water, and energy security is: ‘How much?’ With water, the answer cannot be ‘enough to stay
alive.’ There are only two kinds of people on earth – people with enough water to stay alive and
dead people.”).
136. See id. (“The real question . . . is: ‘How much to achieve what standard of living’?”).
137. New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2216.
138. Id.
139. See Cross, supra note 3, at 901 (“While all language is somewhat ambiguous, positive
rights . . . suffer from particular indeterminacy. The reason for this indeterminacy is that such
rights are consequentialist, requiring the judiciary to create a program that achieves a given
result.”).
140. See PATRICK MONAHAN, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CHARTER,
FEDERALISM AND THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 126 (1987) (arguing that if courts were to
enforce provision rights, they would become embroiled in the same budgetary and tax debates
that the concept of judicial review was designed to avoid in the first place).
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or overreaching.
To avoid these problems, executive agencies and legislatures may
take a second approach by quantifying the minimum quantity and
142
quality of public utilities services required to meet a positive right.
This effectively helps to relieve ill-equipped courts from the burden
143
of adjudicating complex ecologic and economic questions. However,
such rigid minimum standards may prove unworkable as conditions
differ both temporally and spatially from case to case. For example,
changes in climate and population can quickly make a minimum
144
standard obsolete. To the extent that courts meaningfully evaluate
these minimum standards, they are left to make ad hoc
determinations of the viability of these minimum standards under
145
different localized conditions. As with fleshing out vague and
indeterminate guarantees of “sufficient” water, courts are often
forced to make technical determinations for which they are ill-suited,
146
even when a minimum standard is established. The courts are then
faced with the familiar challenge of determining the degree to which
they should defer to standards established by executive agencies in
147
implementing the legal right in question.
The judicial application of what is termed the “Ben Avon
doctrine” in the United States illustrates the challenges associated
148
with judicial review of agency actions in the realm of public utilities.
141. See Cross, supra note 3, at 901 (arguing that, when faced with “imperfect information”
about specific conditions, judges “are likely to do very little to promote the ends commanded by
[provision] rights”).
142. See, e.g., New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2217 (describing Johannesburg’s standard
of six kiloliters per month per household).
143. Id.
144. Melissa J. Luttrell, The Case for Differential Discounting: How a Small Rate Change
Could Help Agencies Save More Lives and Make More Sense, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 80,
95–96 (2011).
145. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 83–85 (S. Afr.) (noting that
the South African Constitutional Court has previously expressed the difficulties associated with
deciding cases that have broad social and economic consequences); Cross, supra note 3, at 903–
05 (illustrating the complexities associated with judicial enforcement of positive rights such as “a
minimal level of subsistence”).
146. See Christine A. Klein & Ling-Yee Huang, Cultural Norms as a Source of Law: The
Example of Bottled Water, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 507, 534 (2008) (arguing that state legislatures
in the United States have failed to adequately update the “law governing the initial
appropriation of water resources” and that courts deciding cases concerning bottled water
“necessarily produc[e] reactive and fact-specific decisions, rather than comprehensive legislative
guidance”).
147. See id., at 535 (recounting an example where the Texas Supreme Court deferred).
148. Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergency of New
Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 430–31 (2007); see generally Ohio Valley
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Where a government agency sets a public utility’s rate so low that it
effectively requires the company to use its property for the public
benefit without just compensation, the rate is confiscatory and
149
constitutes an unlawful exercise of eminent domain power. In Ben
Avon, the U.S. Supreme Court held that courts review agency
ratemaking decisions de novo where the utility company claims that
the rate is confiscatory, because the question is one of a fundamental
150
constitutional right. The rationale behind the Ben Avon doctrine is
that, courts should give greater scrutiny to agency determinations in
151
questions of infringement of fundamental constitutional rights.
More recently, courts have moved away from the Ben Avon doctrine
and have instead been highly deferential to agency ratemaking
152
determinations for public utilities. The rationale behind this move is
that value of the judicial protection against agency overreach in
ratemaking is outweighed by the court’s relative lack of expertise and
153
the costs of uncertainty associated with litigating rates de novo.
This new, more deferential approach to ratemaking cases is
instructive for implementing a positive right to public utilities. When
courts cannot effectively review cases involving violations of positive
rights because they lack institutional competence, the positive right is
154
too weak to further interests in equity and sustainability.
B. Positive Rights to Public Utilities and Sustainability
Under ordinary formulations, the object of a positive right to
public utilities is to provide equitable access to water, energy, and
sanitation without jeopardizing the ability of future generations to

Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
149. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 515–16 (1898); see also Jim Chen, The Second Coming of
Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1552–54 (1999).
150. Ben Avon, 253 U.S. at 289; see also Leslie A. Glick, Independent Judicial Review of
Rate Making: The Rise and Demise of the Ben Avon Doctrine, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 305, 305
(1971).
151. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CASEBOOK 872 (1994); see also E.F.
Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action by the Federal Supreme Court, 35
HARV. L. REV. 127, 139 (1921).
152. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (in which the
Supreme Court did not review constitutional facts de novo in a confiscatory ratemaking case,
instead deferring to the agencies’ ratemaking methods so long as the rate itself is reasonable.);
see also Glick, supra note 150, at 307–08 (discussing the split among courts over the continued
viability of the Ben Avon doctrine).
153. Glick, supra note 150, at 306; see also Schiller, supra note 152, at 431.
154. New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2191.
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enjoy that same access. In other words, positive rights to public
utilities aim to achieve both intra-generational equity (the ability of
the poor to afford sufficient access to adequate public utilities
services) and inter-generational equity (the ability of future
156
generations to enjoy services on those same terms). In practice,
however, applying positive rights to public utilities may actually
frustrate efforts to achieve intra-generational and inter-generational
equity in the provision of water, sanitation, and energy.
Capital-intensive natural monopolies require a return on
investment to attract capital and expertise, but also to promote
157
maintenance and upgrades for degrading or obsolete infrastructure.
However, a positive rights approach to public utilities often results in
large general subsidies to these utilities and underpriced service
because the right is interpreted or implemented as requiring low or
158
no cost provision of at least some amount of utilities service to all.
When regulators set low rates to meet a positive right guarantee of
public utilities, the lack of full cost recovery precludes effective
159
maintenance and reinvestment in infrastructure. In effect, positive
rights to public utilities tend to be economically unsustainable.
Positive rights to public utilities are often formulated in a way
that either ignores, or is hostile to the idea that water and energy are
valuable commodities requiring expensive infrastructure to fully
160
develop. For example, some have argued that full cost recovery is

155. See Craig A. Arnold, Water Privatization in the United States: Human Rights, National
Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 785, 790 (2009)
(describing six duties in a rights based approach, including duties of equity and sustainability).
156. See generally Edith Brown-Weiss, The Plantary Trust: Conservation and
Intergenerational Equity, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495, 558 (1984).
157. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944); see also Roger
D. Colton, Prudence, Planning and Principles Ratemaking – A Reply to Professor Schwartz, 35
HASTINGS L.J. 723, 734–35 (1984).
158. Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 940–41; see also MICHAEL J. ROUSE,
INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF WATER SERVICES: THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS 38, 40–47 (2013) (outlining the planning, financing and cost recovery considerations
inherent in the provision of water services). Of course, water is often underpriced and policies
fail to achieve full cost recovery in many instances even without a recognized positive right to
water. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and
Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671, 674 (1993).
159. Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 940–41; see also Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity,
Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1873, 1882–84 (2005).
160. See Int’l Conference on Water and the Env’t, Dublin, Ir., Jan. 26-31, 1992, The Dublin
Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, princ. 4, U.N. Doc. A/COMF.151/PC112
[hereinafter, “The Dublin Statement”] available at http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/hwrp/
documents/english/icwedece.htmlat 4 (noting inefficient use of water and pointing out that the
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161

inconsistent with the idea of positive rights. They argue that
“[i]nstead of commodifying [public utilities] even further, we need to
recover [utilities] by treating [them] as part of the commons and by
162
strengthening community participation in [utilities] management.”
Such a formulation of the positive right to public utilities is
counterproductive for three major reasons. First, many countries are
reluctant to recognize any positive right to public utilities because
they are concerned that a “[positive right] may mean free
provision . . . which they simply cannot afford” without recovering
163
costs from consumers. As such, formulations of a positive right
hostile to cost recovery often discourage states from applying a rights
framework to their public utilities because they are understandably
164
reluctant to assume obligations they are unable to meet.
Second, where a positive right to public utilities requires
provision of water, energy, and sanitation at low or no cost, lack of
cost recovery results in degraded infrastructure and, ultimately,
165
inadequate delivery. There is a relationship between the “economic
sustainability” of public utility services and the “recovery of costs
through . . . [consumer] tariffs that are equitably assigned based on

resource “has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an
economic good”). “[I]t is vital to recognize . . . the basic right of all human beings to have access
to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price. Past failure to recognize the economic value
of water has led to wasteful and environmentally damaging uses of the resource.” Id.
161. See Bluemel, supra note 118, at 963–65 (explaining how “[t]reating water as an
economic good without limitation as is done under the principle of full cost recovery can lead to
inequities”).
162. MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, BLUE GOLD: THE FIGHT TO STOP THE
CORPORATE THEFT OF THE WORLD’S WATER 210 (2002); see also VANDANA SHIVA, WATER
WARS: PRIVATIZATION, POLLUTION AND PROFIT ix–x (2002) (classifying a contemporary
“clash of . . . two water cultures” as between “a culture that sees water as sacred and treats its
provision as a duty for the preservation of life and another that sees water as a commodity, and
its ownership and trade as fundamental corporate rights”).
163. See Asit K. Biswas, Water as a Human Right in the MENA Region: Challenges and
Opportunities, 23 INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 209, 215 (2007) (“Since [a provision right
to water] simply cannot be achieved within the foreseeable future, these countries prefer not to
recognize this concept until their responsibilities and accountabilities are clarified, as well as
those of the consumers”).
164. See McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 105, at 685 (observing that many countries party
to the ESC Covenant “simply do not have the financial and capacity-related resources to
implement the items identified as core obligations in relation to the right to water”).
165. Cf. James Salzman, Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
94, 115 (2006) (“[T]he fact that the very poor do pay for water, and pay quite a bit in relative
terms, suggested that they both can and will pay for piped water. Thus the principle of ‘full cost
recovery’—charging a price to cover costs and profit—has seemed both possible and desirable.”
(citation omitted)).
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ability-to-pay.” The challenges faced by both India and South
Africa illustrate how a positive rights approach to public utilities may
lead to a failure to fully recover costs, ultimately undermining the
rationales behind a positive right as the degraded system fails to
167
deliver what the right promises.
Third, where the positive right to public utilities precludes or
discourages cost recovery, it also discourages much needed
168
investment in public utilities infrastructure. Billions of dollars are
needed in the coming years to secure and maintain adequate global
water and sanitation infrastructure, with the regions most in need
169
being least able to absorb those costs. Much of the growing
challenge of global water stress can be attributed to a dramatic
shortfall in necessary capital to fund improvements in water
170
infrastructure. The same level of investment in energy infrastructure
is needed, particularly in light of the need for climate change
adaptation and mitigation aimed at decreasing greenhouse gas
171
emissions. It is simply not possible to meaningfully implement a
positive right to public utilities without dramatic increases in capital
172
expenditures in utility infrastructure. Such dramatic increases will
166. Jeffry S. Wade, Privatization and the Future of Water Services, 20 FLA. J. INT’L L. 179,
195–96 (2008).
167. New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2220–28.
168. In 2000 the United Nations adopted its “Millennium Development Goals” (MDGs),
which included the goal “to halve, by the year 2015, . . . the proportion of people who are unable
to reach or to afford safe drinking water.” G.A. Res. 55/2, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept.
18, 2000). In tandem with these “lofty expectations,” the ESC Covenant “places at minimum a
moral responsibility on wealthy nations and international financial institutions for seeing that
[the MDGs] are fulfilled.” McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 105, at 685.
169. See Salzman, supra note 165, at 115 (observing in 2006 that the capital investment
needed for water and sanitation infrastructure approached $100 billion per year over the next
twenty-five years and that “the weak financial resources of developing country governments
prevent them from absorbing the costs of water provision upgrades” (citation omitted)).
170. See Thomas M. Kerr, Supplying Water Infrastructure to Developing Countries via
Private Sector Project Financing, 8 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 94–95 (1995) (explaining how
“[t]raditional sources of funding for [water] infrastructure have not met the critical needs of
developing countries”); MICHEL CAMDESSUS, FINANCING WATER FOR ALL 1 (2003)
[hereinafter CAMDESSUS REPORT], available at http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/
world_water_council/ documents_old/Library/Publications_and_reports/CamdessusReport.pdf
(asserting that water must be treated as an economic good and investment sources tapped more
efficiently to tackle funding deficits).
171. See generally Frank A. Felder, Climate Change Mitigation and the Global Energy
System, 25 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 89, 94–96 (2014).
172. See Meera Mehta, Thomas Fugelsnes & Kameel Virjee, Financing the Millennium
Development Goals for Water and Sanitation: What Will It Take?, 21 INT’L J. WATER
RESOURCES DEV. 239 (2005) (examining whether African countries can meet the MDGs given
“large funding gaps”).
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not come unless there is support for effective full cost recovery in the
173
public utility sector.
Where a positive right is framed as access to resources or services
174
“free of economic encumbrances,” such a right is counterproductive
to the development, provision, and expansion of affordable public
175
utilities. Again, the debate surrounding the human right to water is
illustrative of the problem for all public utilities. The recent World
Water Commission strongly advocated full cost pricing of water
services, noting that “the single most immediate and important
measure that we can recommend is the systematic adoption of full
176
cost pricing for water services.” The concern, of course, is what
impact full cost pricing of water will have on the poor in developing
177
countries.
The poor in developing countries often pay up to twenty-five
times more for water from private water vendors than those who have
178
access to a regular tap supply. The charges imposed by water
vendors are not only evidence of the inequity resulting from certain
water policies, but are also evidence that expanding access to tapped

173. See id., at 239–40 (arguing that African countries “will need to implement cost
recovery policies” in attempting to reach the MDGs); CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 170, at
13 (“Sustainable financing for water systems will require greatly improved cost recovery from
their users and increased management efficiency.”). Water infrastructure is uniquely capital
intensive. In the United States, “the ratio of capital investment to revenue is twice as high in
water as in natural gas, and 70% higher than electricity and telecommunications.” Id.
174. See Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating Water as a
Human Right and the Duties and Obligations it Creates, 4 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 331, 349
(2005) (describing the “basic premise” of General Comment 15 as providing an unqualified
right to water).
175. See New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2225 (referring to the counterproductivity to
the development and expansion of affordable clean water supplies).
176. WORLD WATER COMM., A WATER SECURE WORLD 33 (2000); see also Peter Rogers,
Radhika de Silva & Ramesh Bhatia, Water is an Economic Good: How to Use Prices to Promote
Equity, Efficiency, and Sustainability, 4 WATER POL’Y 1, 1–17 (2002) (“We argue in this paper
that the conventional wisdom is incorrect—increasing prices can improve equity. Higher water
rates allow utilities to extend services to those currently not served and those currently forced to
purchase water from vendors at very high prices”).
177. See Shelley Ross Saxer, The Fluid Nature of Property Rights in Water, 21 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 49, 109–10 (2010) (observing that some developing countries fear that
expanded privatization of water infrastructure with the aid of foreign corporations would
subject the “poor . . . [to] high prices and service cut-offs” (citation omitted)).
178. ROUSE, supra note 158217, at 16, 47; see also Sudhirendar Sharma, Watermarkets
Exclude the Poor, in THE VALUE OF NATURE: ECOLOGICAL POLITICS IN INDIA 141,145 (Smitu
Kothari, Imtiaz Ahmad & Helmut Reifeld eds., 2003) (“World Bank sponsored studies indicate
that urban poor already pay five times the municipal rate for water in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire; 25
times more in Dhaka, Bangladesh; and 40 times more in Cairo, Egypt.”).
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and treated water can reduce the poor’s expenditures on water.
However, such expansion requires significant investment in
infrastructure. When infrastructure goes unfunded because of a
failure to recover costs, delivery becomes inconsistent, quality
180
decreases, and the ones who suffer most are the poor. Where a
positive right to public utilities is framed in such a way as to interfere
with full cost recovery, the right is counterproductive to its presumed
181
end of protecting the economically disadvantaged.
Guaranteeing affordability through a positive right can interfere
with essential full cost recovery, resulting in a regressive policy that
ultimately harms the poor and frustrates efforts to achieve inter182
generational equity. When the positive right to public utilities
eliminates incentives to conserve, it not only harms the poor in the
183
present, but future generations as well. Low rates and large
subsidies prevent consumers from internalizing the costs of their
consumption of resources provided through public utilities, leading to
184
waste and unsustainable use. Appropriate utility service pricing, on
185
the other hand, encourages sustainable use. Thus, reasonable water
186
pricing is essential to water sustainability. Free or heavily subsidized
water services lead to waste of water resources with implications for
inter-generational equity and the environment because water is
187
withdrawn faster than it is naturally restored.
179. New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2226.
180. See ARTHUR C. MCINTOSH, ASIAN WATER SUPPLIES: REACHING THE URBAN POOR
35 (2003) (“Water and poverty are linked by private operators with concessions promising to
bring investment funds to the table to improve coverage, which they have not done, and water
and poverty are linked by the poor suffering as a consequence.”).
181. New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2226.
182. Id. at 2231.
183. Id. at 2231–33; see generally Daniel A. Farber, From Here to Eternity: Environmental
Law and Future Generations, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 289 (2003).
184. ROUSE, supra note 158, at 40–43.
185. See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 170, at 18 (arguing that “full cost recovery from
users is the ideal long-term aim”); Priceless, THE ECONOMIST (July 17, 2003),
http://www.economist.com/node/1906846 (noting that the colossal underpricing of water leads to
overuse and waste, and contending that sensible water pricing, reflecting actual costs of
treatment and transport, would correct the challenge of water conservation).
186. Marwaan Macan-Markar, World Bank Backs Privatizing Water, Critics Dismayed,
INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 17, 2003.
187. See NORMAN MYERS & JENNIFER KENT, PERVERSE SUBSIDIES: HOW TAX DOLLARS
CAN UNDERCUT THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY, (2001), at 123–31 (describing how
water shortages and a lack of clean water in developing countries lead to deaths from waterrelated diseases, economic harm because of the time that people take each day to find water,
and environmental damage through the drainage of wetlands and the depletion of fish stocks);
Glennon, supra note 159, at 1883 (encouraging a reform of the present system by eliminating
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There is a growing awareness that large general subsidies
produce waste that is not ecologically sustainable, particularly in
resource-scarce regions, and that general subsidies in energy and
188
water are harmful in the long run to the environment. General
subsidies have been particularly linked to severe environmental
189
damage in developing countries. Low cost or free water, promoted
under the auspices of a positive right, thus has led to the depletion of
water supplies for people and the environment, as well as an overall
190
degradation of water quality.
The same problem of waste from large subsidies arises in the
191
energy sector. If the positive right to public utilities results in large
subsidies to the energy sector, then energy consumers will have little
incentive to conserve energy, thus aggravating greenhouse gas
emissions and the sustainability issues surrounding global climate
192
change. The basis for many of the policy proposals that seek to
mitigate climate change – such as carbon taxes or cap-and-trade
schemes – is cost internalization to promote conservation and
193
renewable energy. And where these approaches fail, a more

subsidies as a strategy that “would gain people’s attention about their water use through their
pocketbooks” and noting that water prices are “ridiculously low”).
188. See Peter P. Rogers, Water Governance, Water Security and Water Sustainability, in
WATER CRISIS: MYTH OR REALITY? 3, 4–10 (Peter P. Rogers et al. eds., 2006) (discussing water
sustainability issues).
189. See David L. Feldman & Helen Ingram, Multiple Ways of Knowing Water Resources:
Enhancing the Status of Water Ethics, 7 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2009) (noting that
ecologists see water subsidies as damaging to the environment). This focus on low-cost water
demonstrates another inherent problem of any “human rights” approach to water policy, but
particularly the positive human rights approach’s emphasis on cheap or free water—its inherent
“humanness.”
190. See Sharad K. Jain, Anupma Sharma & Rakesh Kumar, Freshwater and Its
Management in India, 2 INT’L J. RIVER BASIN MGMT. 259, 263–64 (2004) (explaining that largescale extraction of groundwater in India has led to overdraft and a fall in the water table); J.M.
Sharp, Jr. et al., Effects of Urbanization on Groundwater Systems, in EARTH SCIENCE IN THE
CITY: A READER 262–63 (Grant Heiken et al. eds., 2003) (explaining that due to the increased
pumping, an aquifer in Texas is no longer able to maintain two major springs that are needed to
“ensure the survival of several species of flora and fauna that only exist” in that area).
191. John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance,
49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 67–68 (1998).
192. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be
Allocated on a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51, 76 (2009) (“[A]ny tax or cap-and-trade
system that requires firm or individuals to internalize the social cost of their greenhouse gas
emissions is efficient, in the sense that under these schemes firms and individuals will use energy
only when the social benefits (including their own profits or consumption) are greater than the
social costs (including the costs to the climate).”).
193. See, e.g., Joshua Meltzer, A Carbon Tax as a Driver of Green Technology Innovation
and the Implications for International Trade, 35 ENERGY L.J. 45, 52 (2014) (arguing that these

Larson-Macro (Do Not Delete)

32

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

2/9/2016 5:00 PM

[Vol. XXVI:1

localized approach where regulators set utility rates to encourage
conservation could be an alternative path to mitigating climate
194
change.
Thus, to the extent that a positive right to energy produces
energy subsidies that preclude cost internalization and conservation
incentives, the positive right to energy could aggravate the
sustainability challenges associated with global climate change. In
short, where the positive right to public utilities fails to recover costs
of service, it is economically unsustainable and intra-generationally
inequitable. When the positive right is implemented so that
consumers do not internalize the cost of consumption, the right is
likewise ecologically unsustainable and inter-generationally
inequitable. The anthropocentric focus on low- or no-cost public
utilities services therefore raises serious concerns as to the
195
sustainability of a positive right to public utilities.
C. Positive Rights to Public Utilities and Transparency
The possible inequities arising from the positive right to public
utilities are not limited just to concerns of cost recovery and cost
internalization. The way in which public utilities are managed and
regulated as natural monopolies often impedes effective
implementation of a positive right. Regulators who set rates and
grant concessions to utility companies may be politically motivated to
set low rates to satisfy the demands of their constituency for low cost
water and energy, with the positive right serving as the legal excuse
196
for setting low rates.
As such, a positive right may result in
undervaluing public utility services in the name of political
197
expediency. Once constituents are satisfied with free or low-cost
utility services provided in the name of a positive right, there is little

policies misperceive “the balance between achieving environmental goals and minimizing
economic costs.”).
194. Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for You, Bad for Us: The Financial
Disincentive for Net Demand Reduction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1527, 1554 (2012).
195. See Leonard Hammer, Indigenous Peoples as a Catalyst for Applying the Human Right
to Water, 10 INT’L J. MINORITY & GRP RTS. 131, 134 (2003) (arguing that the human right to
water as contemplated by General Comment 15 “seems to adopt an anthropocentric model,
whereby the environment exists to serve the basic needs of human beings.”).
196. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and
the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1027 (1988) (discussing this phenomenon in the
context of the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act).
197. Herbert Hovenkamp & John A. MacKerron III, Municipal Regulation and Federal
Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 719 n.241 (1985).
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incentive for the public to provide any oversight of utility
198
companies Therefore, a need arises for transparency.
199
In fact, public oversight of utility companies is critical. Utility
companies frequently secure grants of a natural monopoly through
200
concession contracts between the company and the state. These
contracts set forth the scope of the natural monopoly – how long the
company will hold the monopoly and over what geographic areas – as
well as the mechanisms for financing, cost recovery, and government
201
oversight. Both utility companies and regulators are likely to be
motivated by self-interest, and may therefore engage in corrupt
202
concession contracting processes. In those instances, a positive right
to public utilities could serve as the legal excuse for rent-seeking
regulators and public utilities companies to secure long-term
203
concessions and guaranteed public subsidization. Corruption in the
concession contracting process thus has the potential to undermine
positive rights to public utilities because it can guarantee large
subsidies to private utility companies while the public remains
rationally disengaged from the concession contract due to the
204
affordable services that the positive right ensures. As long as the
public is not fully internalizing the cost of its utility consumption, it is
unlikely to demand transparency and accountability in the concession
contracting process.
Such a lack of transparency and accountability in concession
205
contracting can have enormously detrimental impacts on the public.

198. See Vandenbergh, supra note 194, at 1533–34 (observing that consumers’ short-term
interests are satisfied as long as utilities are low-priced).
199. See, e.g., William H. Ellerbe, Toward Legitimacy Through Collaborative Governance:
An Analysis of the Effect of South Carolina’s Office of Regulatory Staff on Public Utility
Regulation, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 219 (2011).
200. PETER VINCENT-JONES, THE NEW PUBLIC CONTRACTING: REGULATION,
RESPONSIVENESS, RELATIONALITY 141–43 (2006).
201. JOSÉ A. GOMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE: MONOPOLY, CONTRACTS,
AND DISCRETION 84–91 (2009).
202. See generally Charles Kenny & Tina Soreide, Grand Corruption in Utilities, (WORLD
BANK POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO. 4805 (2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1327274 (identifying corruption as one
potential reason why privatized utility services haven’t performed well in low- and middleincome countries).
203. New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2189.
204. See, e.g., Wilford A. Payne, III, The Regulatory Pitfalls of Distributive Generation: No
Standardization in Access or Standby Rate Structures, 2 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 61, 65 (2001)
(noting how some energy utility companies have used regulations to prohibit distributed power
facilities).
205. See, e.g., Emmanuelle Auriol & Aymeric Blanc, Capture and Corruption in Public
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For example, corrupt officials may grant a public utility concession
without any competitive bidding process, effectively eliminating one
of the few instances where competition can drive down costs and
206
improve a natural monopoly’s efficiency and performance. Corrupt
officials can further eliminate the role of competition by prohibiting
any alternative means of distributing water, sanitation, or energy
207
services. For instance, the state can force more customers to the
private utility company by outlawing or increasing the cost of
distributed energy sources, such as solar or wind, distributed water
sources, like wells and rainwater harvesting, or distributed sanitation,
such as latrines.
The Bolivian Water War of 2000 illustrates the challenges
associated with concession contracts and the positive right to public
utilities. The City of Cochabamba in Bolivia was suffering from
severe water supply, quality, and infrastructure problems at the
208
time. Only a small percentage of the City was connected to the
water system, with many forced to find alternative water supplies at
209
high cost or high risk. To secure necessary loans to improve water
services, the City, at the encouragement of the World Bank,
210
privatized its water supply and infrastructure. The concession
contract was awarded to a consortium led by Bechtel, called Aguas
Del Tunari (ADT), without any competitive bid or public stakeholder
involvement, and guaranteed 16% return on investment to ADT for
211
40 years. The guaranteed rate of return resulted in a rate increase of
212
35%, with some water bills rising as much as 200%. In part to
guarantee sufficient customers, and in part to encourage connection
Utilities: The Cases of Water and Electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa, 17 UTIL. POL’Y 203 (2009)
(tracing the issue of high-priced, privatized service utilities to local corruption).
206. OSCAR OLIVERA & TOM LEWIS, ¡COCHABAMBA! WATER WAR IN BOLIVIA 5 (2004).
207. Id. at 9.
208. See id. at 7–8 (explaining the city’s historical problems with water and water supply).
209. See id. at 8–9 (explaining the way Cochabamba’s residents received water at the time
the government privatized the water utility).
THE
ECONOMIST
(July
17,
2003),
210. See
Private
Passions,
http://www.economist.com/node/1906828 (discussing the water infrastructure projects the
Bolivian government desired to accomplish through privatizing the utility); Kristin Komives,
Designing Pro-Poor Water and Sewer Concessions: Early Lessons from Bolivia 1 (World Bank,
Working Paper No. 2243, 1999), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=629179
(explaining that governments of developing countries often turn to privatization to fund
infrastructure improvements).
211. See Andrew Nickson & Claudia Vargas, The Limitations of Water Regulation: The
Failure of the Cochabamba Concession in Bolivia, 21 BULL. LATIN AM. RES. 99, 105–112 (2002)
(detailing the nature and effects of the Bolivian concession contract for water provision).
212. Id.
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to a clean drinking water system, alternative (and in some cases,
traditional) methods of gathering water were prohibited, including
213
rainwater harvesting.
The public response to Cochabamba’s prohibition on alternative
water sourcing and increased water rates quickly escalated into large214
scale protests of the concession contract. Protestors claimed that the
concession to ADT, and the related rate increases and associated
prohibition on alternative water provision, violated a fundamental
215
human right to water. After a prolonged and violent standoff, the
protestors and the government reached an accord which nullified the
concession contract, repealed prohibitions on alternative water
provision, and turned over ownership and operation of the city’s
216
water services to the municipal government. Yet despite these
reforms, water quality and services in Cochabamba today remain
problematic, with more than half of the city’s population unconnected
217
to services.
The Cochabama example demonstrates an ineffective approach
to providing water. A potential solution to problems illustrated in
Cochabamba could involve a state government guarantee of water
and energy to its citizens at a certain price. That positive right would
then provide the legal requirement for large general subsidies
directed at private utility companies building and operating the
213. OLIVERA, supra note 206, at 8.
214. See id. at 33–49 (detailing the standoff and conflict that eventually lead to water
management in Cochabamba being entrusted to the municipal government).
215. Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31
ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 966–67 (2004).
216. Id. Cochabamba claimed that ADT had abandoned the city and thus voided the
contract as the grounds for nullifying the concession contract. See Timothy O’Neill, Note, Water
and Freedom: The Privatization of Water and its Implications for Democracy and Human Rights
in the Developing World, 17 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 357, 370–71 (2005–2006)
(describing the events leading up to the rescission of the water contract between the Bolivian
government and ADT). ADT brought a claim against the government of Bolivia in the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), claiming breach of the
concession contract and violation of international law. See Amanda L. Norris & Katina E.
Metzidakis, Public Protests, Private Contracts: Confidentiality in ICSID Arbitration and the
Cochabamba Water War, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 30, 42 (2010) (providing an account of
ADT’s actions after water services in Cochabamba were turned back over to the municipal
government).
217. See Juan Forero, Bolivia Regrets IMF Experiment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/14/business/worldbusiness/14iht-water.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0 (“[H]alf of the 600,000 people in Cochabamba remain without water, and those who
do have service have it only intermittently, some as little as three hours a day.”); ROUSE, supra
note 158, at 141–42 (2007) (detailing the state of Cochabamba’s water supply after the failed
attempt at privatization).
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218

infrastructure. In the name of securing positive rights to public
utilities, alternative approaches to water, sanitation, or energy
provision could be prohibited. Corrupt officials could further
eliminate competition by avoiding a competitive bidding process for
the concession. The public choice theory explanation for this
approach is that utility companies will encourage positive rights as a
means of limiting competition while also guaranteeing large general
219
subsidies. Citizens would be unlikely to oppose those general
subsidies, even if corrupt and unsustainable, both because they are
receiving free or underpriced utilities services, and also because
collective action problems and rational ignorance effectively preclude
220
public opposition.
Even where there is no corruption or rent-seeking in the
concession contracting process, the politics of public utility regulation
under a positive rights regime remains problematic. The public is less
likely to engage with the development of water policy when it is not
impacted by water rates, making water policy development less
221
transparent and less participatory. This situation – where consumers
fail to provide adequate oversight of the provision of goods and
services because they are receiving those goods and services at low
cost – is analogous to health insurance and health care in that health
care consumers often fail to stay informed regarding costs and
effectiveness of treatment because the majority of the actual cost is
222
borne by the insurance company. This rational indifference or
rational ignorance limits transparency because consumers do not seek
information on efficiency and effectiveness when the cost of obtaining

218. See generally Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Corruption, Legitimacy and Human Rights: The
Dialectic of the Relationship, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 495 (1999) (comparing and contrasting the
discourses of corruption and human rights).
219. See generally B. Delworth Gardner, Water Pricing and Rent Seeking in California
Agriculture, in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 45 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1983); Randal Rucker & Price Fishback, The
Federal Reclamation Program: An Analysis of Rent-Seeking Behavior, in WATER RIGHTS:
SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 83 (Terry L.
Anderson ed., 1983).
220. See generally Shawn J. Bayern, Rational Ignorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and
Modern Economic Formalism in Contract Law, 97 CAL. L. REV. 943 (2009) (arguing that
narrow economic formalism is inappropriately used in courts).
221. See Vandenbergh, supra note 201, at 1531–34 (observing that consumers’ short-term
interests are satisfied as long as utilities are low-priced, even if the long-term costs of
inefficiency are ultimately greater).
222. Thomas L. Greaney, Regulating to Promote Competition in Designing Health Insurance
Exchanges, 20 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 237, 242 (2011).
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the information exceeds the cost of obtaining an acceptable level of
223
effectiveness. Similarly, water and energy consumers receiving no or
low-cost services will not invest time in providing necessary public
oversight of, and stakeholder participation in, public utility
regulation.
The example of Bolivia illustrates that it is not essential to enact
a positive right to public utilities in order for public corruption to
infiltrate concession contracting. Even so, a positive right can provide
the legal foundation for such corruption, and can limit the
stakeholder engagement necessary for appropriate oversight of an
otherwise monopolistic regime. This is true particularly when the
sustainability of scarce and essential resources is at stake. Thus, the
absence of a positive right to public utilities is preferable to
unenforceable and inequitable rights which facilitate public
corruption. While the aims of positive rights to public utilities may be
laudable, ultimately, positive rights must be evaluated for their
224
pragmatic utility. Without a pragmatic orientation, positive rights
“are grounded in nothing more than an altruistic desire to take a
symbolic action without regard for the interests of the very
beneficiaries they purport to benefit,” and reflect only “the
225
conscience of the more privileged.” If enforceability, sustainability,
and equity are the aims of the positive rights approach to public
utilities, then such rights must be framed and implemented with those
aims in mind.
III. HOW TO ADAPT POSITIVE RIGHTS TO PUBLIC UTILITIES
The characteristics of public utilities make implementation of a
positive right difficult, but not impossible. In order to effectively
implement a positive right, such a right must be tailored to the public
utility, while keeping in mind the aims of enforceability, transparency,
and sustainability. This Part proposes three ways to adapt the
implementation of a positive right to the unique characteristics of
public utilities: (A) creation of specialized tribunals; (B) a tariff
223. Id.; see also Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived
Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 771 (1993) (“Rational consumers will invest
only up to the point at which the marginal cost of additional information equal the marginal
benefits.”).
224. See Cross, supra note 3, at 878–80 (explaining why the rejection of pragmatism in the
evaluation of positive rights is flawed).
225. Id.; see also MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960–1973 143 (1993) (noting that litigation strategies are not the best way
to combat poverty because the lawyers often have only second-hand knowledge of the issues).
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structure where the largest consumers pay the highest rates; and (C) a
transparent and participatory public concession contracting process.
A. Specialized Tribunals for Public Utilities Cases
Despite the flaws inherent in the current approach, a workable
version of a positive right to public utilities could prove pivotal in
successfully achieving equitable global access to water, sanitation, and
226
energy.
However, one of the main obstacles to an enforceable
positive right to public utilities is the relative lack of expertise of most
courts in rate-setting, ecology, infrastructure finance, and public
health relating to public utilities. To address this shortfall in
institutional competence, states seeking to implement a positive right
to public utilities should institute specialized tribunals with relevant
227
expertise in public utilities to adjudicate these positive rights.
A specialized court is one with jurisdiction, typically exclusive, in
228
a single legal field. The advantage of this approach is that the
specialization of the court affords it the institutional competence to
adjudicate within a field that is highly technical and requires a high
229
degree of expertise. This approach has been taken in the fields of
230
bankruptcy, tax, corporate law, and patents. More than simply
providing an informed adjudicator in a complicated dispute, the
institutional competency of specialized courts also protects the rights
231
of the parties from arbitrary action by the executive. Where a court

226. See generally J. Haeusermann, A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT
(1998).
227. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67
(1995) (arguing the virtues of specialized tribunals).
228. Id. at 69; see also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989).
229. Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of
Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 192 (2003).
230. See, e.g., Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State,
84 IND. L.J. 57, 125–26 (2009) (discussing the U.S. Tax Court’s specialized procedures and its
relative institutional competence); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology:
Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 843 (1999) (noting the institutional
competence of the Court of Federal Claims in adjudicating intellectual property rights); Richard
B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring Up Article III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post
CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85, 100 (1988) (noting the flexibility and specializing of
bankruptcy courts); John J. Gibbons, The Quality of the Judges is What Counts in the End, 61
BROOK. L. REV. 45, 46 (1995) (noting the role of specializing in the Delaware Court of
Chancery).
231. Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive
Treaty Interpretation, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1763 (2007) (arguing that an overly-deferential
judiciary driven by concerns of institutional competency can threaten the role of the judiciary
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reviewing executive action lacks field-specific competence relative to
the executive agency it reviews, it typically defers to that agency’s
expertise, as was seen in the South African Constitutional Court’s
232
deference to the City in Mazibuko. But where the reviewing court
has sufficient expertise to effectively review the actions of the
executive de novo, and particularly where those actions affect
fundamental constitutional rights, the court is more likely to provide
233
an effective bulwark against executive overreach.
The use of specialized tribunals in deciding cases involving
natural resources is not without precedent. The U.S. Supreme Court
often relies on special masters in cases involving inter-state water
234
disputes precisely because of their institutional competence. Special
masters play important roles in large general stream adjudications
because of the high level of complexity, typically involving thousands
235
of parties and technical evaluations of hydrologic models. Similarly,
the State of Colorado relies on special water courts to adjudicate
water disputes, recognizing that expertise is necessary to effectively
adjudicate disputes involving water rights priority, water efficiency,
236
and the reasonableness of water uses. Evaluations of Colorado’s
system have commended it for its fairness, adaptability, and

plays in checking the power of the executive).
232. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 6–7 paras.11–12, 179 (S.
Afr.); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that where
Congress has not spoken unambiguously in a statute, courts should defer to agency
interpretations of statutes implemented by that agency unless the interpretation is
unreasonable).
233. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–15 (2005) (holding that strict
scrutiny, rather than deference, was appropriate in reviewing claims involving Constitutional
rights); see also Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law
Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2032 (2011) (arguing that
judicial deference to executive agencies in cases involving individual constitutional rights is
“inconsistent and inchoate” in part because the relative expertise of the courts vis a vis the
agency in such cases allows for a more searching review).
234. See generally Margaret G. Farrell, Coping with Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special
Masters, 43 EMORY L.J. 927, 950 (1994) (noting the role of expertise in appointing special
masters in water cases); see also Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial
Process: Special Masters in the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV.
625 (2002) (noting the role of special masters in interstate disputes).
235. Farrell, supra note 234, at 953; see also David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of
Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States’ Role?, 20
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2, 32 (2001) (noting the role of special masters in Wyoming general stream
adjudications).
236. Tom I. Romero, Uncertain Waters and Contested Lands: Excavating the Layers of
Colorado’s Legal Past, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 521, 540 (2002) (discussing the historical
development of Colorado’s special water courts).
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237

particularly for the high levels of expertise held by the judges. This
success has led to calls for a similar approach in the adjudication of
238
other disputes involving natural resources.
The challenge of implementing this reform can be the higher cost
239
of such specialized courts. However, procedural reforms can reduce
240
costs to provide for efficient adjudication. Such reforms include
disclosures that must be held in a publicly accessible database, limits
on the participation of third parties not directly involved in the
dispute, and cost-sharing and fee structures directed at lowering the
cost of expert engineers and economists as witnesses and
241
consultants. The higher cost potential of specialized courts has not
precluded implementation of this approach in tax, bankruptcy, and
242
intellectual property, and it should not prove any greater an
obstacle in the equally important realm of public utility regulation.
These specialized tribunals should review agency decisions
impacting the positive right to public utilities de novo, with authority
to award damages and issue equitable and declaratory relief.
Critically, a positive right to public utilities should incorporate
stakeholder rights to participate in the formulation of water,
sanitation, and energy policies that are similarly enforceable by
243
specialized tribunals. The courts should be independent of the
executive, and provide oversight of agency adjudication of utility
disputes. By establishing specialized courts, the positive right to
public utilities will cease to be a mere aspirational statement for
executive agencies avoiding effective judicial review through their
relative institutional competence; instead, it will be a right that can be

237. Id. at 547–49.
238. See, e.g., Barbara Cosens, Resolving Conflict in Non-Ideal, Complex Systems: Solutions
for the Law-Science Breakdown in Environmental and Natural Resource Law, 48 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 257, 297 (2008) (noting certain aspects of the Colorado water court system
function as a useful template for resolving certain environmental and natural resource cases).
239. David M. Getches, foreword to P. ANDREW JONES & TOM CECH, COLORADO WATER
LAW FOR NON-LAWYERS x (Univ. Press of Colo. 2009) (finding the costs associated with
specialized water courts in Colorado “troubling.”).
240. Charles W. Howe, Reconciling Water Law and Economic Efficiency in Colorado Water
Administration, 16 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 37, 39-40 (2013) (proposing reforms to enhance
the efficiency of the Colorado water courts system).
241. Id.
242. Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329
(1991); Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519 (2008).
243. New Right in Water, supra note 4 (arguing for participation rights in water
guaranteeing access to stakeholder processes relating to rate-setting, access, quality, and
financing).

Larson-Macro (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2015]

2/9/2016 5:00 PM

ADAPTING HUMAN RIGHTS

41

enforced by judges capable of balancing economic, financial, ecologic,
and public health interests.
B. Block Tariffs and Direct Subsidies in Public Utilities
A specialized tribunal is an important step in transitioning a
positive right in public utilities from aspirational to functional in that
it avoids the obstacle of institutional competence that has often
precluded effective judicial enforcement of positive rights. It does
not, however, address the issues of intra-generational equity and
sustainability. The implementation of a positive right to public
utilities must not only result in affordable water, sanitation, and
electricity services to the poor in the present, it must also recover
costs to maintain and upgrade infrastructure and encourage
conservation of resources. To balance these potentially competing
aims, the implementation of the positive right to public utilities must
be coupled with tariff reform.
The first reform that must be adopted are block tariffs – utility
244
rates that increase as consumption increases. Block tariffs can be
effective in ensuring access to a minimum amount of water at an
245
affordable price, while still achieving full cost recovery. The largest
consumers of water, energy, and sanitation would bear the greatest
burden of ensuring cost recovery, and have a correspondingly greater
246
incentive for conservation. At the other end, indigent consumers
who require only enough public utility service to meet a minimum
247
standard of living would pay the lowest rate.
This approach alone, however, still leaves open the question of
whether that low initial block rate would be affordable to all, and
whether everyone would still have incentives to conserve resources by
internalizing the cost of consumption. Without additional reforms, the
block tariff approach leaves unanswered questions of how much
water and energy domestic users will receive in the initial, low-priced
248
block. The block tariff approach should therefore be coupled with
244. Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 951; see also ROUSE, supra note 158, at 45–47.
245. ROUSE, supra note 158 at 64–66; see also Sharmila L. Murthy, The Human Right to
Water and Sanitation: History, Meaning and the Controversy over Privatization, 3 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 89, 134 (2013).
246. Glennon, supra note 159 at 1883–84.
247. Id.; see also Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 950–51.
248. See generally John J. Boland & Dale Whittington, Water Tariff Design in Developing
Countries: Disadvantages of Increasing Block Tariffs (IBTs) and Advantages of Uniform Price
with Rebate (UPR) Designed, International Development and Research Centre (2000),
http://www.efdinitiative.org/sites/default/files/071f_water20tariff20design.pdf
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direct public utility subsidies to indigent consumers based on their
249
ability to pay.
This is the approach Chile has taken with water provision, and it
250
can be adapted for public utility services in general. In 1998, Chile
enacted a new Tariff Law to encourage full cost recovery and
251
equitable pricing. Central to the new Tariff Law was a direct
252
subsidy to poor households. These households would go to their
local government, which would make an ability-to-pay
253
determination. The household would be required to pay what it
could afford based on the amount of its consumption (thereby
internalizing at least some of the cost of consumption and having an
254
incentive to conserve). The local government would then provide a
direct subsidy in the form of a “water stamp” to cover the rest of the
255
cost of water provision.
Block tariffs alone can disproportionately burden poor
households because water vendors may buy water in bulk from the
public utility at the higher rate, and then pass the cost on to the poor,
256
who rely most on water vendors in developing countries. Increasing
block rates may also prevent firms from reaching the economies of
scale needed to benefit poorer consumers (by preventing farm
consolidation or larger-scale industrialization of energy and water
257
resource development).
As with many of the challenges and
opportunities associated with positive rights to public utilities, this
issue would likely arise more in urban areas of large developing
countries, where the cross-subsidy to poor consumers will require
greater distortion of the rate structure due to the larger numbers of
economically disadvantaged citizens. Additionally, wealthier
households and businesses are more able to bear the cost of water249. See Jessica Budds & Gordon McGranahan, Are the Debates on Water Privatization
Missing the Point? Experiences from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 15 ENV’T &
URBANIZATION 87, 109 (2003) (discussing the water voucher system in Chile).
250. ROUSE, supra note 158, at 209–12.
251. Id. at 210–11.
252. See generally Pablo Serra, Subsidies in Chilean Public Utilities, Body of Knowledge on
Infrastructure
Regulation,
regulationbodyofknowledge.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/
Serra_Subsidies_in_Chilean.pdf (arguing Chile designed subsidies targeted to the poor at a
relatively low cost to the State).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See James Salzman, supra note 165, at 118 n.167.
256. Murthy, supra note 44, at 134.
257. See id. at 133 (stating that the human right to water and sanitation requires states to
examine their tariff structure because of the effect it can have on the poor).
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efficient or energy-efficient technologies. By supplementing the block
tariff approach with the Chilean direct subsidy approach, the poor
would be able to afford water connections without the need to seek
out water vendors.
A similar approach is possible with energy and sanitation. Utility
companies charge low rates at the first block – below the cost of
provision – with higher rates charged for higher blocks of
consumption (up to an amount exceeding the cost of provision).
Revenues generated from those higher blocks would fund directed
subsidies at the local level. Those directed subsidies would be
provided after an ability to pay determination, such that all
consumers internalize the costs of consumption, both to incentivize
conservation and to facilitate cost recovery.
However, this approach has potential pitfalls too. The energy
258
and agricultural industries are the largest water consumers, and if
block tariffs make water more affordable for the poor, but the costs
of increased water rates on energy and agriculture are passed on to
the poor in the form of higher energy and food prices, then the block
tariff approach might not ultimately achieve the overall goal of equity
and affordability. The embedded nature of water and energy – virtual
water and virtual energy – make it difficult to establish equitable
pricing of these utility services without any increased block rates
being reflected in the costs of other goods and services. Ultimately,
though, the essential roles of water, energy, and sanitation in
achieving a minimum standard of living argues in favor of addressing
equitable pricing at the utility level.
Several counterarguments can be made to the general aim of full
cost recovery and cost internalization, even for poor consumers of
public utility services. In particular, many argue that large general
subsidies allow for payment of public utility services without
259
requiring consumers to pay high tariffs. These general subsidies
260
would be funded from general tax revenues. Advocacy for positive
rights is often coupled with arguments in favor of large general
subsidies as a means of ensuring expanded access to poor
261
communities and avoiding rate increases. General subsidies in

258. Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 950.
259. See Murthy, supra note 44, at 134 (citing the UNDP’s suggested guideline that no more
than 3 percent of household income be spent on water or sanitation).
260. Id. at 134; see also John H. Barton, Nuclear Power: The Politics of Security and
Development, 25 STAN. L. REV. 622, 634 (1973); Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 940–41.
261. See Elizabeth Burleson, Emerging Law Addressing Climate Change and Water, 5
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developing countries are “motivated predominantly by social
objectives,” including ensuring provision to the poor, under the
262
assumption that the poor cannot afford to pay for utility services.
The water sector is again illustrative of the problem of direct
subsidies and positive rights more generally. Currently, cost recovery
of drinking water services in developing countries averages 35
percent, with water prices “set at a fraction of the marginal costs of
263
supply.” The economic burden of underpriced water in developing
countries is approximately $13 billion per year, with total subsidies
for drinking water in developing countries exceeding $45 billion per
264
year. The cost-recovery gap will ultimately harm the poor most. The
rich will benefit from subsidized utility services, and the poor will be
left without access, with poor quality, or with higher rates they must
265
pay to vendors. The ability-to-pay determination, combined with
utility stamps funded from revenues generated through block tariffs,
facilitates both cost-internalization for all consumers and full cost
recovery. At the same time, it also provides affordable public utility
services without excessive public debt or general subsidies that would
lead to a lack of consumer cost-internalization.
C. Effective Concession Contracts for Public Utilities
The ultimate success or failure of these tariff reforms may
depend on the degree to which utility companies become partners in
facilitating a positive right to public utilities. Rates must be set at a
level high enough not only to achieve cost recovery and conservation
incentives, but also to attract capital, maintain credit, and retain
expertise. However, if regulators set rates too high, resulting in
monopolistic pricing, and then fail to provide adequate oversight, the
positive right to public utilities will be undermined by poor quality
and unaffordable rates. And where there is little transparency or

ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 489, 496–99 (2010) (advocating for continued public
participation in water management, including “sensible subsidies”).
262. André de Moor & Cees van Beers, The Perversity of Government Subsidies for Energy
and Water, in GREENING THE BUDGET: BUDGETARY POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPROVEMENT 24, 32–38 (J. Peter Clinch et. al. eds., 2002).
263. Id. at 36.
264. Id. at 36–37.
265. See id. at 39 (concluding that “[r]eforming current water-pricing practices will . . .
generate the necessary resources to expand public water services, while governments and
banking institutions could then provide credit facilities to low-income groups to safeguard an
easy access to public drinking water”); ROUSE, supra note 158 at 47–49 (offering various
approaches to improving the valuation of water so as to assist the poor).
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stakeholder involvement in developing public utility policy,
corruption may ultimately prove more damaging to the prospects of
positive rights to public utilities than inadequate pricing or
institutional incompetence.
In the case of Cochabamba, bad public utility services were made
worse by a bad concession contract, which itself was replaced by
266
further bad public utility services. The failed attempt to improve
water utility services in Cochabamba is a cautionary tale for any state
attempting to implement a positive right to public utilities. It
demonstrates how inadequate concession contracting processes can
interfere with attempts to improve public utility services. Any right to
public utilities will ultimately prove counter-productive if it is not
enforceable, equitable, and sustainable. But effective oversight and
enforcement by a specialized judiciary will be meaningless if the
concession contract makes other enforceable guarantees that
preclude the provision of equitable and sustainable public utilities.
And achieving equitable pricing and cost-internalization will be
impossible if the concession contract establishes a rate of return that
allows monopolistic pricing. As such, specialized public utility courts
and tariff reforms must be combined with a fair, transparent, and
participatory public concession contracting process. That process
must be overseen by the public utility court, which would have
authority to grant relief for procedural and substantive violations of
concession contracting requirements established by statute.
The process failed in Cochabamba because of a lack of
transparency, legitimacy, and oversight. Effective government
oversight requires the state to ensure that the concession contract
process attracts acceptable potential utility partners. The size of the
concession must be large enough to attract good management and
267
achieve economies of scale. This may require coordination of
multiple consecutive systems, and the use of technology to integrate
those systems, which should be anticipated in the solicitation of bids
268
for the concession contract. The concession contract period should

266. See generally Nickson, supra note 211, at 100 (outlining the pre-contract services and
why the contract failed).
267. ROUSE, supra note 158, at 207.
268. See James E. Meeks, Concentration in the Electric Power Industry: The Impact of
Antitrust Policy, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 64, n.192 (1972) (stating that coordination between power
plants can allow them to meet the needed economies of scale) (quoting Commonwealth Edison
Co., 36 F.P.C. 927 (1967), aff’d sub nom. Utility Users League v. FPC, 394 F.2d 16 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 953 (1969)).
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be long enough to encourage management commitment and
continuity, but short enough to provide the incentives associated with
269
the re-tendering of the contract.
Effective government oversight of the concession contract
process also requires performance reviews at regular intervals during
270
the contract term. Underperformance, measured by a failure to
achieve regulator-established benchmarks, would result in penalties
271
and possible rescission. This approach facilitates public-private
coordination, contract compliance, and regulatory oversight, and is
similar to the approach taken in some regimes for the concession of
onshore and offshore development of state-owned oil and gas
272
rights. The concession contract must also recognize the role of an
273
This
independent agency for environmental protection.
independence places environmental protection and resource
sustainability on equal footing with effective pricing, and avoids
sacrificing sustainability and ecological health in the name of financial
viability alone. While the aim of the positive right to public utility is
inherently anthropocentric, if it is excessively so, the aim of that right
to achieve inter-generational equity will ultimately be frustrated by
274
unsustainable practices.
Effective government oversight of the concession contract must
be coupled with transparency in how the agreement with utility
275
companies is reached and administered. Importantly, the concession
276
must be made through a transparent competitive bidding process.
The power of competition to achieve efficient pricing cannot be
ignored even in the case of natural monopolies. Competitive bidding
processes avoid corruption and facilitate affordable rates by awarding
concession contracts to the party best able to achieve the objectives of
277
a positive right to public utilities at the lowest cost.

269. ROUSE, supra note 158, at 207.
270. Id.
271. Id.; see also Gail Osherenko, New Discourses on Ocean Governance: Understanding
Property Rights and the Public Trust, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 317, 379 (2006) (“The
government should craft contracts . . . with care to allow for periodic performance review . . . .”).
272. See Osherenko, supra note 271, at 362.
273. See id., at n.319.
274. New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2235.
275. Id. at 2248.
276. See John Ziegler, The Dangers of Municipal Concession Contracts: A New Vehicle to
Improve Accountability and Transparency, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 571, 581 (2011) (stating that
Chicago needs to have competition and transparency in its concession contracts).
277. See id. (stating the competitive bidding requirements will ensure Chicago will obtain

Larson-Macro (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2015]

2/9/2016 5:00 PM

ADAPTING HUMAN RIGHTS

47

In addition to a transparent competitive bidding process, the
contract itself must facilitate transparency by setting forth clear
278
objectives and information sharing requirements.
Information
sharing would include participation by potential bidders in the
279
formulation of specifications for the system or improvements. The
role of information sharing in particular is an effective bulwark
280
against corruption in concession contracting. The terms of the
contract should also specify the performance benchmarks against
which the utility company will be judged in regular performance
reviews. Transparency is the best safeguard against abuses that would
281
undermine a positive right to public utilities.
The concession contracting process must also be perceived as
282
legitimate in order to facilitate a positive right to public utilities.
The concession contract should therefore require a participatory
stakeholder process and consumer consultation during the term of the
contract to ensure successful management and acceptance of the
283
pricing mechanism. And it is through community engagement that
legitimacy, sustainability, and racial and gender equality in public
284
utilities are achieved.
Of course, there is no reason a concession contract should be
necessary in all instances. Many arguments against full cost recovery
and cost-internalization policies are based on concerns about the risks
285
associated with privatization of public infrastructure. Concerns over
cost recovery, pricing, and capital investment in infrastructure are
286
often conflated with advocacy for infrastructure privatization, a
287
global trend that has created challenges in many nations.

the most cost-effective contract).
278. Id.
279. See generally STEVEN KELMAN, PROCUREMENT AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 90–95
(1990) (arguing for greater information sharing between private concessionaires and the state).
280. Courtney Hostetler, Going from Bad to Good: Combating Corporate Corruption on
World Bank-Funded Infrastructure Projects, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 231, 271 (2011).
281. See Nicholas Miranda, Concession Agreements: From Private Contract to Public Policy,
117 YALE L.J. 510, 521–22 (2007) (stating the creation and implementation of concession
agreements lack transparency).
282. See id. at 523 (stating that “without accountability” the public is left powerless) .
283. ROUSE, supra note 158, at 207.
284. Okezie Chukwumerije, Peer Review and the Promotion of Good Governance in Africa,
32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 49, 95–97 (2006).
285. New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2229–30.
286. Id. at 2230.
287. See Arnold, supra note 155, at 796, 798 (stating that the privatization of water supplies
and infrastructures is a global trend that is appearing prominently in developing countries, but
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Privatization is advocated on the one hand as a way of facilitating
access to capital and technical expertise, promoting efficiency,
reducing costs through competitive bidding, expanding access, and
288
improving quality. On the other hand, some argue that privatization
is a dereliction of the government’s public trust in a shared common
resource and unduly burdens the poor as utility rates are raised to
289
ensure debts are repaid and profits secured. Although the merits of
privatization are beyond the scope of this Article, it is sufficient to
290
note here that cost recovery is not synonymous with privatization.
Furthermore, as demonstrated in the Cochabamba example,
corruption and a lack of transparency and public participation can
291
occur with or without a positive right to public utilities. Any
conception of a right to public utilities, therefore, should include
rights associated with stakeholder involvement and transparency in
the development of water, energy or sanitation policy, whether
through concession contracts to private utility companies or in
alternative public management or public-private partnerships in the
management of utility infrastructure.
Among the range of options, concession contracts are often an
important part of attracting investment and expertise into developing
countries in the greatest need of upgrading their public utilities
292
infrastructure. As capital investments are made, and as citizens
develop expertise, the concession contract approach can help a state
to transition away from private ownership of public utility

has led to intense conflicts over a variety of issues and faces public opposition in places such as
Bolivia); John Briscoe, The Changing Face of Water Infrastructure Financing in Developing
Countries, 15 WATER RESOURCES DEV. 301, 302 (1999) (noting that there is a global trend of
an increase in private investment in developing countries’ infrastructures).
288. See McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 105, at 700 (“Some see [private sector]
involvement as an efficient way of tapping into capital and technical expertise, thereby
achieving both access and conservation goals, increasing the network of official water service
provision, and increasing the quality and efficiency of that service.”).
289. See id. at 700–01 (“Others see private sector involvement as a violation of the right of
people to a shared, common resource, and as further alienating poor communities by depriving
those without means of the ability to pay for necessary water resources.”).
290. See id. at 701 (noting that the South African Constitution allows for the payment of
water services but does not allow for the denial of basic water access to those that cannot pay,
placing a financing or political burden on the government). Corporatized publicly-owned
utilities, effective and transparent regulatory oversight, and public-private partnerships have the
potential to achieve many of the benefits of privatization, including effective pricing and
affordable service to poor communities. See generally ROUSE, supra note 158.
291. Budds & McGranahan, supra note 249, at 108.
292. See Ziegler, supra note 276, at 575–77 (stating that concession contracts are able to
deliver to the public more effectively and at a lower cost than public partners).
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infrastructure toward true public-private partnerships and public
293
Many concession contracts are
ownership of infrastructure.
specifically designed for short-term transitions, including BuildOperate-Transfer (BOT) contracts, where the utility designs, builds,
and operates the public utility for a time until it has earned an agreed
upon return on its investment, after which ownership is transferred to
294
the public. In these types of public-private partnerships, cost
recovery, sustainability, and affordability remain the aims of a
positive right to public utilities while the privatization of
295
infrastructure and resources is avoided. These aims can be achieved
when the positive right is effectively enforceable by a specialized
court, when tariffs allow for full cost recovery, cost-internalization
encourages conservation, directed subsidies ensure service for all, and
when there is a transparent and legitimate partnership between the
state and any private entity engaged in public utilities services.
CONCLUSION
So far, obtaining positive rights to public utilities has largely
failed to achieve the aim of greater access to water, energy, and
sanitation. However, the positive right to public utilities is still in its
infancy as a policy tool. The human rights to water and sanitation
have grown in acceptance in both international law and in domestic
constitutions, though neither has been widely adopted or enforced
thus far. A human right to energy, on the other hand, remains largely
theoretical. The human right to energy has perhaps not risen along
with the others in part because energy has not been traditionally
perceived as essential to human welfare as water and sanitation.
However, energy is diverging from water and sanitation as its
characteristics become less and less those of a public utility. The
increasing use of distributed energy through solar and wind projects

293. See generally Sepp I, Hukka & Katko, Public-Private Partnerships in Water and
Sewerage Services: Privatization for Profit or Improvement of Service and Performance, 6 PUB.
WORKS MGMT. & POL’Y 45 (2001).
294. See generally Thomas P. Hanley, Jr., The BOT Circular: An Evaluation of the New
Regulatory Framework Governing Privately-Financed Infrastructure Projects in the People’s
Republic of China, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 59 (1999) (describing the use of BOT contracts in
China). Many countries transition from pure concession contracts to agreements where private
parties are contractors, and the state owns the infrastructure). See, e.g., Bryan W. Blades,
Production, Politics, and Pre-Salt: Transitioning to a PSC Regime in Brazil, 7 TEX. J. OIL GAS &
ENERGY L. 31, 34–35 (2012).
295. See Hanley, supra, note 294, at 72–73 (stating that the gains of privatization are
realized while the government still maintains long-term control).

Larson-Macro (Do Not Delete)

50

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

2/9/2016 5:00 PM

[Vol. XXVI:1

allows for greater competition and lower initial capital costs. Retaillevel competition in the energy sector, combined with efforts to
deregulate the energy industry, may change the energy sector in ways
relevant to the viability of a positive right. Energy would cease to be
an effective natural monopoly, and the role of a positive rights
approach to energy could come to resemble education and health
care more than water. More research is needed on the impact of
renewable, distributed energy upon the viability of a positive right to
public utilities.
Furthermore, additional research is required to understand
where the characteristics of public utilities make a positive right more
difficult, and when those characteristics might facilitate a positive
right. Where the marginal cost of service is low in an existing system,
it may be easier to recover costs at low rates, thus making a positive
right easier to achieve. The characteristics of public utilities may thus
pose a threat mainly to new systems in urban areas of the developing
world. A comparative analysis of existing positive rights to water and
sanitation in different areas may reveal when the characteristics of
public utilities are assets in the implementation of positive rights and
when they are liabilities.
The problems of corruption, unsustainable practices, and lack of
enforcement are likely not limited to positive rights to public utilities.
When implementing human rights to food, education, or health care,
similar challenges are likely to arise and will require careful
implementation adapted to the unique characteristics of the good or
service guaranteed by the right. A positive right to education, for
example, may require adaptive implementation similar to a positive
right to public utilities in order to achieve transparency due to the
role of state-funded or state-financed education. But the positive right
to education may not require cost internalization adaptations such as
those proposed for public utilities because there is less concern for
sustainability. Each positive right must be adapted to its own unique
policy and regulatory environment in order to achieve the aims of
sustainability, transparency and enforceability. Without those aims,
and without such adaptation, the right will not survive. More research
will be needed to determine what unique adaptations are required of
other positive rights like food, education, or health care.
It is understandable that policy entrepreneurs seek to prioritize
essential goods and services like health care, education, food, water,
and sanitation through the enactment of positive rights. Codifying
such aspirations as human rights has expressive value, even when
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those rights are effectively unenforceable. But the implementation of
a human right to each must be adapted to achieve an enforceable
right implemented sustainably and with transparency. Too often,
vague formulations of human rights lead to corruption and
unsustainable practices. To avoid this outcome, all human rights
should be implemented with an eye toward what makes the
guaranteed good or services unique, with the aim of achieving
enforceability, transparency, and sustainability.

